

An Exercise in Frustration:
The Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1300

Christopher Candy
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Abbreviations:

- CCR:* *Calendar of the Close Rolls* (London, 1900-8)
- CDS:* *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, 1-4, ed. J. Bain (1881-8); 5, ed. G.G. Simpson and J.D. Galbraith (Edinburgh, 1986)
- CPR:* *Calendar of the Patent Rolls* (London, 1893-1)
- Edward I:* Prestwich, M.C. *Edward I* (Berkeley, 1988)
- Edward of Carnarvon:* Johnstone, Hilda. *Edward of Carnarvon, 1284-1307* (Manchester, 1946)
- Langtoft:* *The Chronicle of Pierre de Langtoft*, ed. T. Wright, 2 vols (Rolls Series, 1886)
- Liber Quot:* *Liber Quotidianus Controtulatoris Garderobiae, 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al* (1787)
- Parl Writs:* *Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons*, ed. F. Palgrave, 2 vols in 4 (Records commission, 1827-34)
- Rishanger:* *Willelmi Rishanger, Chronica et Annales*, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series, 1865)
- Under the Hammer:* Watson, F.J. *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1307* (East Linton, 1998)
- War, Politics and Finance:* Prestwich, M.C. *War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I* (1972)

Chapter 1: Introduction

There is a castle near them called Caerlaverock, which has done and does great damages every day to the King's castle and people... The people of Scotland are aware of the alliance between the King and the King of France, whereby they are much cast down. [I] ask him [the king] to turn his face to Scotland and they will be discomfited...

Robert Felton, constable of Lochmaben Castle, October 1299¹

Such was the letter written to the king by the constable of the main English garrison in the western part of Scotland in 1299. Over three years since the king's first campaign into Scotland had passed, and the country had still not been subdued, despite successful campaigns and the superiority of the English in resources and men. Felton must have been gratified by the response to his letter: Edward, for various reasons, led his next campaign into Annandale and Galloway in what is often referred to as the Caerlaverock campaign of 1300.

The need for the campaign was sizeable. With the success of the English at Falkirk in avenging the defeat at Stirling Bridge, Edward must have felt in a position to bring Scotland under full control on a permanent basis. To do this required further campaigning in Scotland to follow up on the success of 1298, eliminating the last opposition and securing the castles providing the focus for further resistance to royal control. Preparations for such campaigning were put into motion, with requests for men-at-arms sent to the sheriffs, twelve earls, and one hundred six others in late September. Additionally, purveyance requests were issued on December 12, 1298².

Unfortunately for Edward's ambitions, the campaign plans for 1299 fell victim to political problems in England and negotiations with France. Dissension over the confirmation of charters such as the Forest Charter and the *Confirmatio Cartarum* caused problems on the domestic front. Meanwhile, the negotiations that resulted in

¹ CDS, ii, 1101

Edward's marriage to Margaret, the sister of Philip IV of France eliminated Edward's ability to go on a protracted stint of warfare in Scotland. The end result of this was an unhealthy delay in re-embarking on major military campaigning north of the border for the year³.

Such efforts were needed. Despite the defeat at Falkirk, Scottish resistance was alive and well. Stirling was placed under blockade, with its ninety-man garrison's supplies cut off. Caerlaverock Castle fell, and immediately became the focus of resistance in eastern Galloway with its garrison striking repeatedly at Lochmaben, though not without cost⁴.

With the failure to take an army into Scotland during the normal campaigning season, Edward either had to accept the possible loss of Stirling that loomed upon the horizon, or engage in an unpopular winter campaign. Needless to say, Edward did attempt to carry through with a winter campaign. Equally needless to indicate was the unpopularity of such a campaign – of the sixteen thousand infantry requested on September 18th, 2500 were all that appeared⁵. The failure to carry through this last attempt at a campaign in 1299 had major repercussions: Stirling Castle fell, and would not be retaken until 1304⁶. The scene was set for 1300, and the Caerlaverock campaign of the summer.

In studying the Caerlaverock campaign, numerous elements have to be closely examined to gain an understanding of how the English army during the middle of the Scottish wars was put together, its composition, and its use. Knowing when the army was put together can help highlight political matters or the necessity for planning military action ahead of time, but does little to help us understand the size or makeup

² *CPR 1292-1301*, p 388

³ *Edward I*, p 483

⁴ *CDS*, ii, 1119, 1101

⁵ *CDS*, ii, 1092, 1111; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 95

of the force such forethought assembled. Similarly, understanding how the army was constructed does not guarantee us any understanding of whether it was successful or not in achieving its aims.

The narrative or chronology of the events of the year will have to be examined. Though the campaign itself did not leave Carlisle until early July and was over by September, the events surrounding it began from the moment the winter campaign failed to materialize until the truce concluded on October 31st. Within this framework we can put the various elements of preparation, the army and its parts, and the consequences of the successes and failures of that army.

The army itself needs to be looked at. How large was it? What type of forces comprised it? Was it effectively put together? Was a coherent whole, or a disparate collection of elements that failed to show any cohesion? Did it stay intact throughout the campaign, or were there large changes in numbers. The two main arms of cavalry and infantry will have to be taken up in detail, with the differences in their recruitment, organization, and pay structures being brought to light.

The means to support this force in the field deserves notice, though this has been covered heavily by other authors in the past. The methods for getting the supplies necessary for feeding and keeping the army in the field will be summarized, along with a synopsis of the amounts of victuals taken for this year. Receiving special attention will be the naval support the campaign received, thanks both to complete records and to the efforts made to regularize the organization of the ships involved.

Finally, a look at the consequences of the campaign will be necessary. The events of the year will be shown in light of the years before and after it during the wars, and the interrelations summarized. The immediate receipts and costs of the

⁶ *Edward I*, p 484

regnal year will be integral to this, as will a look at what the campaign changed in Scotland for both the English and the Scots.

Throughout it all, the documentary sources that shed light on each of these areas will be mentioned, while areas where documentary evidence does not exist or appears not to have been survived will also be noted. While we sometimes cannot reconstruct what was in the documents that have not passed through the years to us, we can at least note their absence and the limitations it places on our understanding.

Chapter 2: Narrative

Before looking at the events surrounding the campaign of 1300 and the battles and sieges during it, the sources of evidence we have for the year have to be considered. The campaign, after all, was part of a sizeable war that affected the entirety of the British Isles at one level or another, be it through actual warfare being carried out on the lands or the drawing of troops, supplies, or money from the regions to support the warfare. Due to the relative lack of major events, the primary sources we have to draw on are somewhat different than other years, such as that of the Falkirk campaign of 1298.

The chronicle evidence we have for the campaign is rather small. Few accounts give anything more than three or four lines to the entire year's military endeavours, preferring instead to focus on the Pope's letter delivered by Archbishop Winchelsea to Edward, ordering him to desist his actions in Scotland. The two major chronicle or literary sources from the time are Rishanger's *Chronica et Annales*, and *The Song of Caerlaverock*, a metrical poem in French describing the bannerets present at the siege of Caerlaverock and purporting to describe their exploits during the attack.

Most of what concrete evidence we have is from administrative or bureaucratic sources. The complete wardrobe book from Edward's regnal year twenty-eight luckily survives, including the majority of the expenses from the campaign. This is the largest single source of information we have, as it covers any and all costs incurred by the campaign, from the wages paid soldiers to what victuals were purchased where via purveyances. Other large sources of information are the

standard archives and calendars of government correspondence such as the Patent, Close, and Fine Rolls.

In November 1299, Edward attempted to carry through a winter campaign in Scotland, having been unable to follow up the success of Falkirk the year before with a summer campaign due to political dissension in England. Despite writs being issued to gather sixteen thousand infantry, the army that the king hoped to take north from Berwick failed to materialize. At most 2500 men reported to the muster, only to desert immediately afterward. With neither the infantry required nor the cavalry needed due to lacking magnate support for the winter exercise, Edward was forced to call off the attempted excursion. After receiving advice on the matter, the king laid plans for a summer campaign the next year, this time focused upon the west of Scotland rather than the east⁷.

Much of the previous action during the 1296 and 1298 campaigns had been focused on the eastern seaboard of Scotland and in the central regions surrounding Stirling. Most of the population was settled in these areas, as well as key fortifications controlling the countryside such as Berwick, Dunbar, Edinburgh, and Stirling. The previous battles between the English and Scots during the past four years had also occurred in these areas, with Dunbar in 1296, Stirling Bridge in 1297, and Falkirk in 1298.

However, the western regions also were of great strategic importance to both the English and the Scots. Galloway and Annandale bordered on the northern English county of Cumberland, just across the border from Carlisle. Men from these areas had joined in William Wallace's raids into England, and were a conceivable

⁷ *Edward I*, p 484

threat unless brought under effective crown control. While some gains had been made over the two years leading up to the campaign, the region was still highly unsettled and difficult.

Alongside the English wish for security were the influences that the region had on politics in Scotland. Annandale and Carrick were strongholds of the Bruces, who figured strongly in the opposition to English rule north of the Esk and Tweed. The expansion of royal control in these areas directly threatened the Bruces as it removed their sources of money, men and supplies and in turn their political influence in disputes with other factions such as the Comyns. Already that year had demonstrated that the factional structures were still continuing, with the apparent replacement of the bishop of St. Andrews, who supported the Bruces, by Ingram d'Umfraville, a Balliol-Comyn supporter, in the role of John Comyn's guardian⁸

The Galloway region was also known for its separatist tendencies in relation to the rest of Scotland. Edward in fact had released Thomas of Galloway, the last connection to the previous Celtic lord of the region, from prison, and had garnered the support of many of the region's major families, such as the MacCans and Macdoualls. While this certainly did not equate to Edward's controlling the region, it did mean that the Scots could not depend on the area being stubbornly set against Edward's policies and control, especially after an effective campaign by the royal host in the region⁹.

To ensure that the summer campaign occurred without any of the problems of the abortive winter exercise, writs for the preparation of the campaign began to be issued almost immediately after the king's leaving Berwick. The decision had been made to muster the host at Carlisle on Midsummer's Day, June 24th.

⁸ *Under the Hammer*, p 102

⁹ *Under the Hammer*, p 103

Unlike previous years, a strict feudal summons was issued in late December, requesting the service due in terms of the old requirements rather than any of the innovations that had caused political troubles in the past. However, the writs did also include the request for the magnates to bring additional men as was in their ability to provide – recognition that the levels of service due were appallingly slight¹⁰.

January 17th saw issuance of writs for purveyances to several counties on or near the eastern seaboard for supplies to be delivered to Berwick and to Westmoreland and Ireland for supplies for Skinburness, Carlisle's port, by Midsummer's Day¹¹. That this was of major importance to the crown was shown by further writs regarding purveyances and their transport to the north being issued up until and during the campaign itself¹². The six-month notice for the collecting and transport of goods, while appearing to be short for the task required, is of equal or greater length to that given in other years. Writs were issued on April 15th, December 12th, and March 1st for the Falkirk campaign, the cancelled 1299 summer campaign, and the 1301 campaign respectively, all requesting the supplies to be delivered by midsummer¹³. Maddicott in his study of the relations between the crown and the English peasantry gives one month before a campaign as the usual time for purveyance requests to be issued¹⁴.

Similar efforts were made for recruiting the naval transport necessary to move supplies from the stores at Carlisle to the army while it was in Galloway. Numerous vessels were brought under contract with the crown to carry supplies, while letters

¹⁰ *Parl Writs*, I, p 347; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 69-70

¹¹ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 487-8

¹² *CCR 1296-1302*, p 401

¹³ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 344, 388, 578

¹⁴ Maddicott, J.R. *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement, 1975)*, p 24

close were issued to the Cinque Ports on April 1st requesting the owed service of their squadron for the summer¹⁵.

Requests for infantry and the appointment of commissioners to gather them were issued on April 30th to several northern counties with a total of sixteen thousand infantry demanded. Separate writs issued on Jan 5th to John de St. John, serving as king's lieutenant in the region, gave him power to accept the men of Annandale, Galloway, and adjacent parts to the king's peace, as well as directing those in any of the northwestern counties and marches to follow the orders and for those eligible for cavalry or infantry service in the region to 'hold themselves in readiness to be at Carlisle, properly appointed, within eight days of their summons'¹⁶

The preparations at Carlisle were left in the hands of John de St. John and the receiver of the stores at Carlisle, Richard Abingdon. Edward himself did not begin his return to the north until the 15th of April, when he and the royal family left St. Albans on a lengthy and wandering procession northward¹⁷. Included in this journey were Queen Margaret, who would give birth to Thomas of Brotherton during the trip, and Prince Edward, whom the king had decided to take on the campaign for his initial exposure to the military side of his future career¹⁸.

Edward reached Carlisle on June 25th, where he was forced to wait for several days to allow the bulk of the various contingents of the army to arrive. The writer of the *Song of Caerlaverock* makes much of the elaborate preparations and the fine appearance of the knights clothed in embroidered fabric gathering there with their banners, the immense array of tents, the voluminous baggage train, and the overall

¹⁵ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 348

¹⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 484

¹⁷ *Itinerary of Edward I*, ed. H. Gough (List and Index Society, 1900), p 154

¹⁸ *Edward of Carnarvon*, p 45-7

power and majesty that the army represented¹⁹. Size however breeds difficulty, especially in terms of supply. Letters close from Edward to officials in Ireland were issued on June 28th to insist on the delivery of late supplies to Skinburness as requested²⁰.

By July 4th, preparations were suitably in place that the order to advance was given after the arrival of the Cumberland infantry forces. Approximately two thousand cavalry and seven thousand infantry were with Edward at this point, though over two thousand infantry would catch up with the main force once in Scotland to swell its numbers²¹. The size and composition of the army will be covered in greater detail in later chapters. The initial aim of the march was to visit the garrisons at Lochmaben and Dumfries, to ensure their security before turning to the more martial objectives of the campaign.

This force crossed the march from Carlisle to the Esk and entered Annandale via the western ford near Bowness called the Sulwath²². The army reached Lochmaben after daily stops at Ecclefechan and Applegarth, where contrary to Rishanger's belief, the castle was not put under siege – having been captured by the English two years before²³. Before leaving the next day for Tinwald, just over four hundred soldiers from the Lochmaben 'garrison' were drawn into the army, an example of Edward's concerns of having a large enough force for the campaign²⁴. From there, the army swung westward past Tinwald and Dumfries, before heading south to the first major altercation with the Scots at Caerlaverock, arriving on July 9th.

¹⁹ *The Siege of Caerlaverock*, ed. N.H. Nicolas (1828), p 2-4

²⁰ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 401

²¹ *Liber Quot*, p 244-6; see appendix 1 for infantry figures


²² *Edward of Carnarvon*, p 49

²³ *Rishanger*, p 439

²⁴ *Liber Quot*, p 247

Caerlaverock Castle, the scene of the campaign's one major siege, was of major importance for both the English and Scots in their strategies for controlling Galloway and the southwest of Scotland. For Edward, Caerlaverock was the last major stronghold in east Galloway still in the hand of the Scots after the fall of Lochmaben during the aftermath of the Falkirk campaign in 1298 and the taking of Dumfries somewhere during the first part of 1300.

Major Strongholds in Eastern Galloway and Cumberland, 1300



With the castle in hand, Edward would have control of all the major fortifications in the area, allowing him to reinforce Dumfries and Lochmaben by sea via Caerlaverock and the Nith, rather than having to rely on the difficult overland route from Carlisle. As long as the Scots held Caerlaverock, however, Dumfries and Lochmaben were both vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks and to attempts to cut their long supply lines from Carlisle. The raiding carried out by Caerlaverock's garrison during the previous years certainly appears to have been effective, despite the loss of its commander Robert Cunningham. Watson indicates that from September 28th until

November 19th in 1299 over two hundred and fifty soldiers were lost to the Lochmaben garrison, either through lack of resources or direct Scottish action.²⁵

The castle's plan is based on a triangular design, rather than a more common square or rectangular model. A round tower stands at either end of the southern wall of the keep, forming the base of the triangular layout. These are connected by straight curtain walls to the large gatehouse at the northern apex of the triangle, formed by twin round towers flanking the main drawbridge. This bridge crosses the large water-filled moat formed by a surrounding earthen bank. The southern wall is curved inward, forming a hollow between the castle and the moat on the south side²⁶.

Caerlaverock Castle, from the northwest



Taken from Steven Cruden, *The Scottish Castle*

While there is evidence of another fortification two hundred metres south of the keep, the likely date of the gatehouse's construction and the unique architectural

²⁵ *Under the Hammer*, p 87

²⁶ Cruden, Stewart. *The Scottish Castle*, p 65-7

form which was described in *The Song of Caerlaverock* make the existing ruins the best candidate for the ‘poor little chastelet’ Langtoft alluded to²⁷.

The siege itself was a triumph of inglorious professionals winning the battle despite the attention heaped upon the ineffectual efforts of the nobility during the short combat. The author of the *Song of Caerlaverock* spends most of his time describing the bannerets present at the siege (though omitting four of them) and their derring-do. He does in time credit the engineers and their siege engines with winning the conflict by flinging stones into the interior of the castle, where upon shattering acted much like modern shrapnel upon the sixty members of the castle’s garrison²⁸.

The length of the siege seems to be uncertain. Hilda Johnstone considered it to last five days, while Fiona Watson says the Scots held out for ‘a day and a night until the following day at terce (9 am)’²⁹. A middle ground between these two interpretations seems the most likely. The next English pay muster for the infantry was held on the 16th, followed by the immediate departure of the army westward into the rest of Galloway³⁰. It is unlikely that Edward, after taking the major objective planned for the first part of the campaign, would willingly depart from it before making the necessary inspection of the fortifications and arrangements for their manning and repair.

However, the *Song* indicates that the besieging army had to wait for the arrival of siege machines by ship before the actual siege could commence. In examining the pay periods for the household bannerets and knights, there is a notable gap in the enrolment of new troops lasting from the beginning of the siege until July 13th. This gap leads me to believe that the period of time Watson referred to occurred on the 12th

²⁷ Langtoft, ii, p 326

²⁸ *Siege of Caerlaverock*, p 82-6

²⁹ *Edward of Carnarvon*, p 51; *Under the Hammer*, p 107

³⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 247-9

and 13th, after a two-day delay in the arrival of the siege equipment. This would account not only for the differing periods referred to for the siege, but also for the need for Edward to move on to complete the campaign's other objectives once Caerlaverock had fallen³¹.

The disposition of the survivors of the keep's garrison is uncertain. The chronicle references are conflicting, with the *Song* author indicating they each received a new robe from the king. However, the wardrobe books show no indication of this. Twelve of the garrison including the constable were sent to Newcastle to be imprisoned, while Prestwich believes some of the garrison were probably hanged³².

Despite this good beginning for the campaign, the trend of events would not continue in such a positive fashion. The army proceeded into Galloway, failing to find the forage in terms of cattle or foodstuffs expected, while the warm, wet summer was undoubtedly hard on the troops. Moving along the southern coast, Edward's army settled into the town of Kirkcudbright on July 19th, which would serve as the main supply port for the army during the rest of its time in Galloway.

While at Kirkcudbright, Scottish envoys including the Earl of Buchan and John Comyn de Badenoch arrived to propose a settlement with the king. Since the Scottish position demanded the return of Balliol to Scotland as king and the return of lands taken from Scottish magnates, there was little chance that it would be received with anything but the contempt and anger that Edward reacted with³³. While the Scots were willing diplomatically to come face to face with Edward and the English host, their forces were much less willing to get so close to the invading army.

³¹ *Siege of Caerlaverock*, p 82-6; See the 'Cavalry' section of this paper for further discussion of this gap in cavalry enrolments

³² *Siege of Caerlaverock*, p 86; *CDS*, ii, 1162; *Edward I*, p 489

³³ *Rishanger*, p 440

Throughout the stay at Kirkcudbright and the first week of August spent at Twynholm, conflict was avoided.

The second week of August saw the only major military activity of the campaign, though the end result of the two incidents was certainly not that the English had hoped for. A foraging party sent out from Twynholm was attacked by part of the Scottish army by the mouth of the Fleet River somewhere between the sixth and the eighth of August, resulting in several horses of the English being killed, along with ‘many foot’ (*multi pedites*) of the Scots. More importantly, the marshal of the Scottish army, Sir Robert Keith, was captured along with Sir Thomas Soules, Robert Baird, William Charteris and Laurence Ramsay³⁴.

Moving westward from Twynholm after this engagement on August 8th, the English host travelled past the Fleet to the Cree River, where the Scottish army was in place upon the opposite side of the ford at the estuary. After some initial arrow fire across the river, part of the English infantry successfully forded the river and engaged the Scots on the far side, who were commanded by the Earl of Buchan on the left, John Comyn in the centre, and Ingram de Umfraville on the right. The cavalry squadrons under Edward and the Earl Warenne also crossed the river, though did not engage under Edward’s orders. However, when the Earl of Hereford was sent forward to retrieve the infantry engaging the Scots and bring them back to the eastern bank, plans changed rapidly. Mistaking Hereford’s movement as bringing reinforcements, the infantry intensified their assault, while the cavalry squadrons still on the eastern bank crossed over. With the full engagement of the English, the Scot forces beat a hasty retreat³⁵.

³⁴ *CDS*, ii, 1147, 1148, 1159

³⁵ *Rishanger*, p 441-2

Unfortunately for Edward, he was unable to take advantage of the victory. His mounted forces and infantry were unsuited for the pursuit of the fleeing Scots through the rough countryside, which they had much more experience of. While the English crown did have troops it could have drawn upon who were experienced in this sort of warfare, there were none in sufficient numbers with the army to carry out the task.

The Welsh, who would have provided the best infantry for rough terrain, were not present on the campaign. Rishanger was in error when accusing them of deserting in large numbers, as Edward had specifically ordered none to be recruited that year, 'because of all the great work which they have done in our service in the past'³⁶. Whether they were not recruited for exactly that reason or for their behaviour on the Falkirk campaign we cannot be sure. Similarly, the best cavalry for rough terrain would have been hobelars, lightly armed horsemen usually recruited from Ireland and used to operating in difficult country. Edward had specifically requested three hundred hobelars from Ireland, but pay records indicate only fourteen from Ireland and six from the garrison at Lochmaben ever served with the army³⁷.

From this point on, the English army, barring the occasional minor skirmish, would not be able to engage the Scots in any military action whatsoever. Edward continued on, travelling through most of Western Galloway with stops at Girthon, Cardoness, and Creetown until reaching Wigtown on August 15th, at which point he began the return leg of the campaign. Passing through Colmicath, Twynholm once more, Crossmichael and Kirkgunzeon, he reached New (Sweetheart) Abbey to be greeted by Archbishop Winchelsea and the papal bull assaulting his Scottish policy –

³⁶ *Edward I*, p 485-6; the original writ is E 159/73, m. 16

³⁷ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 488; Lydon, J. 'The Years of Crisis, 1254-1315' in *A New History of Ireland: Medieval Ireland, 1169-1534*, ed. A.Cosgrave, p 199; *Liber Quot*, p 255

another frustration on top of the nearly completed campaign. Finally, on August 31st, Edward recrossed into England at the Sandywath ford of the Esk to Drumburgh³⁸.

This essentially concluded the king's campaign for the year, a fact highlighted by two grants. The first was the granting of a truce to the Scots on October 30th to last until May 21st of the next year. This was the first truce granted since the conflict began in 1296 to those Edward saw as rebels, and the first acknowledgement of legitimate opposition. The second was the grant of lands, farms, and rents to the value of one thousand marks in England to make up for rents from Galloway unable to be collected by the lack of English control in the region³⁹. While Fiona Watson points out that Galloway was unlikely to be able to produce one thousand marks in rent from the entire region, the fact that a replacement grant for any amount supposed to come from Galloway rents is significant⁴⁰.

³⁸ *Edward of Carnarvon*, p 53

³⁹ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 541, 537-8

⁴⁰ *Under the Hammer*, p 135

Chapter 3: Infantry

The infantry were to be assembled by commissioners of array appointed by Edward at Stamford on April 30th, and then brought to the muster point at Carlisle on Midsummer Day, June 24th. Seven of the northern counties were each assigned two commissioners, with the exception of Yorkshire receiving three in the persons of John de Crepping, Peter du Lound, and William le Vavassur. In addition to their ability to recruit, these men were also to ‘bring to justice and punish as they think fit all those whom they find rebellious in this business’⁴¹. Coming after the disastrous failure in raising anything approaching the requested numbers of troops for the intended winter campaign of 1299-1300, it is no surprise that the final clause was included to allow extra legal pressure to be brought upon the recruits⁴².

In total, sixteen thousand men were to arrive at Carlisle by the end of June for the campaign. The following table details the commissioners appointed and the expectations levelled on each county.

Requested Infantry, 1300 campaign

(Taken from *CPR 1292-1301*, p 512)

<u>County</u>	<u>Commissioners</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Derby	Henry de Braylesford Giles de Menill	1,500
Nottingham	Richard de Byngham Robert de Jorz	1,500
Lancaster	Robert de Holond Matthew de Redman	2,000
York	William le Vavassur John de Crepping Peter du Lound	5,000
Cumberland	John de Wygeton Robert Tyliol	2,000
Westmoreland	Hugh de Multon Thomas de Derwentwater	1,000
Northumberland	Walter de Burghdoun John de Swyneburn	3,000

⁴¹ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 512

⁴² Morris, *Welsh Wars of Edward I*, p 298

The commissioners were drawn from men of the locality, often professional soldiers – William le Vavassur, for instance, was a banneret in the royal household. As seen in the above chart, initially each commissioner was responsible for the recruitment from extremely large areas. However, the difficulties inherent in sending so few men to handle the recruitment had to have been recognized by the crown, as the requests for additional men issued on July 27th for the morrow of the Assumption were much more specific. Individual wapentakes and liberties within Yorkshire were each assigned separate commissioners to engage in recruitment and to ‘compel by seizure of their bodies and imprisonment those who would refuse to come’⁴³. All in all, 4,900 men from twenty-six separate wapentakes and liberties were demanded from Yorkshire; where the initial 5,000 requested were the responsibility of three commissioners, these reinforcements had over twenty-five assigned to their collection⁴⁴.

Clerks were also a part of this process, responsible for the pay of the soldiers mustered until reaching the main host at Carlisle or in its travels in Scotland. A letter close issued at Brotherton on June 10th assigns Roger de Sutton as paymaster for the troops collected in Nottinghamshire and Derby, Robert de Barton to the Northumberland levies, and Henry de Craystock to those detailed to be brought from Lancashire⁴⁵. Further, five clerks including Henry de Craystock are specifically assigned to the previously mentioned reinforcements to be recruited in Yorkshire and Lancashire as of July 27th⁴⁶. This evidence contradicts the assertion made by

⁴³ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 528

⁴⁴ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 512, 528

⁴⁵ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 401

⁴⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 528

Prestwich that clerks were not used after the aborted winter campaign at the beginning of the year⁴⁷.

Notably absent in this process of gathering troops are any requests for Welsh infantry. Previously, Edward had sought out these soldiers for most of his campaigns, with separate writs for their recruitment being given such as that given on April 8th of 1298 in preparation for the Falkirk campaign⁴⁸. Instead, the only writ pertaining to troops this year specifically ordered them not to be recruited. Two factors contributed to this decision. The first was the large amount of troops that had been levelled previously from Wales for previous campaigns. ‘Because of all the great work which they have done in our service in the past,’ as stated in the writ, the Welsh were to be excused⁴⁹. The Welsh had indeed served in large numbers before, to the point of providing half of the infantry forces during the Falkirk campaign.

Hand in hand with this positive impression of the Welsh troops was the negative one caused by their behaviour during the Falkirk campaign. Edward could not have been happy with their delay in entering the fight at Falkirk until the battle was essentially decided, and would not have wanted to suffer a repeat of such behaviour from any part of the army, let alone troops receiving his wages. It was simpler to excuse them than to worry about the uncertainty of their future behaviour.

Unfortunately for Edward, the repeated years of campaigning reduced the number of men that the commissioners of array were able to gather for the muster at Carlisle to a fraction of that requested. Working from the wardrobe book from that year, 9,212 soldiers were receiving pay for July 14th and 15th, the largest numbers the campaign would see and only fifty-eight percent of the original number requested⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Prestwich, *War, Politics, and Finance*, p 100

⁴⁸ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 433

⁴⁹ *Edward I*, p 485-6; the original writ is E 159/73, m. 16

⁵⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 247-249; see Appendix 1 for day-by-day figures

The number of troops present before this, including during the siege of Caerlaverock, were lower in part due to the late addition of four hundred soldiers from Northumberland under William Biset and the arrival of other small contingents from Lancashire and Shropshire.⁵¹

The pay records give little indication of the type and quality of the infantry troops that were recruited for the campaign. This is consistent with the other Scottish campaigns of Edward's. A standard entry would read such as this:

**Reynero de Cotun, constabularius cum equo cooperto et 26 sociis suis, constabulariis cum equis coopertis, et Edmundo de Wateby, Johanni Lenfaunt, et Rogero de Sheffeu, constabulario cum equis discoopertis, pro vadiis suis et 2461 sagittariis peditum de comitatu Eboracensis, a 16 die Julii usque 22 diem eiusdem mensis, utroque computato, per 7 dies, per manus Domini Johannis de Crepping.
£154 16s 8d⁵²**

Each entry begins by listing one or more of the officers receiving pay for the unit by name, followed by the numbers of other officers with barded horses and officers without barding for their mounts. The difference was quite important, as the former received a full shilling a day in wages while men in the latter category, such as the Roger Sheffield of Yorkshire listed in the quoted entry, were given half of what their better equipped fellow officers received⁵³. After the constables would be listed the number of infantry being paid for, and their place of origin. This portion was usually done by county, though a large part of the force from Lancashire were often listed as being from the earl of Lincoln's liberty of Blackburnshire⁵⁴.

The infantry were usually referred to as either archers (sagittarii) or foot (pedites), though with no consistent pattern to indicate an actual difference between the various units' equipment and weapons. As pointed out by Prestwich, the crown

⁵¹ *Liber Quot*, p 247, 249, 248

⁵² *Liber Quot*, p 249

⁵³ *Liber Quot*, p 244, 246

⁵⁴ An example of this can be seen in *Liber Quot*, p 247

did not undertake a systematic effort to arm or equip the infantry forces as it would during the Hundred Years' War, with this campaign being no exception the rule⁵⁵.

Only two types of troops when listed were consistent in detailing the equipment of the men in question. The first are hobelars, light cavalry developed in Ireland and especially good at handling rough terrain. Three hundred of these had been requested from Ireland, but the largest number that served at any point in the campaign was fourteen, drawn from Ireland and from the 'garrison' at Lochmaben⁵⁶. The second are crossbowmen (*balistarii*). Their numbers are also few, being restricted in the main infantry records to individuals such as Thomas Morpeth serving with the young Prince Edward's bodyguard or John Croydon, assigned to the wardrobe⁵⁷.

Each infantryman received *2d* per day in wages. Every twentieth man was assigned as a *vintemar*, acting as subofficers for the constables who each had roughly one hundred men under their command. Unlike the constables, the *vintemars* are merely lumped in with the total number of infantry, despite receiving double the usual pay rate for infantry - *4d* a day in wages⁵⁸. The unit from Shropshire, 22 infantry strong, is notable for having a *vintemar*, John le Crouder, as commander, rather than a constable or mounted officer⁵⁹. Because of the *vintemars* rarely if ever are listed separately from the rest of the infantry, comparing the money paid in wages to the numerical size of various infantry units, especially large ones such as those from Yorkshire and Lancashire can be a difficult undertaking.

The pay records themselves are grouped by time, rather than by county. A typical series of records will begin with the initial entry listing the time of the pay period, as with the example record taken from Yorkshire above being from July 16th

⁵⁵ Prestwich, *War, Politics, and Finance*, p 105

⁵⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 488; *Liber Quot*, p 255

⁵⁷ *Liber Quot*, p 250


⁵⁸ *Liber Quot*, p 243

until the 22nd.⁶⁰ This will then be followed by several other records from the other counties and garrisons, each with the notation of ‘per idem tempus’, or for the same period as mentioned before. On occasion, entries will refer to ‘the previously mentioned X days’, where X is a set period of days referred to in a record separated from the current entry by miscellaneous records covering different time periods.

The entire wardrobe book is quite consistent in its approach to the number of days the infantry are being paid for, though not in the way that the dates themselves are given. Entries vary between being computed from a date given as the first day for the pay period, as the last day being paid for, individual days, or a set period of time with both beginning and ending dates given. Nearly all entries however give the number of days being paid for independent of the date. When both starting and ending dates are given, they are meant to be inclusive in the number of days being paid, as are the dates given for either ‘primo’ or ‘ultimo’ computations.

⁵⁹ *Liber Quot*, p 248

⁶⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 249



This figure charts the changes in infantry numbers listed in the wardrobe book's pay records. All units from the large county forces to small groups such as Prince Edward's guards and the guards for the wardrobe have been included, though any criminals serving for pardons have not. The time frame runs from June 24th and the expected time of the initial mustering, to August 25th and the last listed mustering of any forces by county that were on campaign in Galloway with the king.

Unfortunately, a few factors reduce the accuracy of any charting of infantry numbers. The first is the timing of the various musters for counting numbers and paying the soldiers. From the grouping of the pay and the regularity of the calendar dates listed, musters occurred on July 1st, 5th, 9th, 15th, 22nd, 27th, August 3rd and 25th⁶¹. With the time periods between musters varying from four days to a full three weeks apart, it becomes impossible to do more than estimate the changes in between musters

in terms of troops. New units just joining the campaign often have entries of their own until the next muster, making them relatively easy to track and graph. However, the only markers for losses due to combat, desertion or other factors are the reduced numbers reported at the musters.

Second, after August 26th, there is no data given for county by county forces. From the drastic reduction in troops, almost five thousand in total number, and the amalgamation of the various county units into one from ‘diverse parts of England’, the campaign was essentially ended. Still, the reduction to a single entry of 84 men for those forces that stayed on leaves nothing with which to analyze the origins of the troops that stayed on, and so have been excluded from the chart⁶².

Third, there appear to be entries missing from the wardrobe book for various units. A prime example can be seen in the records for Lancaster. A unit of 987 archers under eleven constables including one Peter Preston enters the pay records from July 5th to the 7th. However, no payment records exist in the wardrobe book for any similar-sized unit on the 8th or 9th. The unit reappears for the July 10th-15th pay period.⁶³ This accounts for the large temporary decrease noted on the chart of infantry numbers, since units are only included for those days where pay records for them are included in the wardrobe book. Similarly, the pay records for Yorkshire are missing the entry on August 18th accounting for the reinforcements that arrived under 8 constables on August 21st⁶⁴.

Similarly, I have included troops in transit to the main army after the siege of Caerlaverock, specifically the Yorkshire unit just mentioned. Before the siege the army was essentially still in the process of being formed up, with units still straggling

⁶¹ *Liber Quot*, p 245-57

⁶² *Liber Quot*, p 257

⁶³ *Liber Quot*, p 244, 248

⁶⁴ *Liber Quot*, p 253

in after their initial request date. After this time, however, all reinforcements were conscious requests of the counties sending them, or as in the case of Northumbria, were passing through the border regions and Scotland and thus essentially were part of the conflict, if not actively engaging the Scots.

Fourth, there are some small groups whose pay is recorded in other segments of the wardrobe book, often in unexpected locations. A classic example of this is found with the eight Gascon soldiers provided by Armand de l'Bret, who served from June 29th until September 23rd. Rather than being recorded as most infantry units were, with l'Bret being paid the wages on behalf of the eight Gascon soldiers, they are included under l'Bret's entry in the *Feoda Et Vadia Banerettorum, Militum, Etc.* half of the cavalry sections of the wardrobe book. There is no mistaking them for mounted troops, as they are clearly labelled as *peditum* in the account entry⁶⁵.

During the course of the campaign, Edward's forces suffered a severe haemorrhaging of forces, from before the beginning of the actual campaign all the way until its indecisive conclusion at the beginning of September. With few battles or sieges being fought but for the short siege of Caerlaverock itself in July and the skirmish at the Cree estuary in early August, relatively little of the reduction in numbers can be blamed upon casualties of war. Desertion instead was the largest source of troop loss.

In fact, desertion would prove to be a difficulty from the very beginning. The Yorkshire forces, over 3,500 of which were under pay by June 24th, melted in amazing numbers day by day while on the march to Carlisle and would continue to do so in large numbers until the campaign itself began. The net loss from the 25th to the 26th of June was over eleven hundred men, while another seven hundred would leave

⁶⁵ *Liber Quot*, p 200

by the 30th⁶⁶. Combined with the sizeable fraction of the requested infantry numbers that the commissioners of array were never able to recruit, such losses before the army had even mustered, let alone set out, could only bode ill.

Once the muster had taken place and the army entered Scotland, losses due to desertion were reduced to minor levels until the siege at Caerlaverock beginning on July 10th. Once the siege was completed, large numbers of soldiers again began returning without leave to England. Between the muster at the end of the army's sojourn at Caerlaverock on July 16th and that taken on August 4th, the army lost 3,391 soldiers from its total numbers. Some units practically disappeared altogether. The Westmoreland contingent lost fully ninety-three percent of its manpower, with 447 of 479 men being lost from the payroll. Yorkshire (70.1%), Derbyshire (73.4%), Nottinghamshire (53.2%), Cheshire (49.8%), and Cumberland (47.9%) all lost near or over half their contributions to the war effort. All in all, forty percent of the forces that had been present at the end of the siege had melted away by August 4th, nearly a week before the skirmish at the Cree⁶⁷.

With the overall picture in hand, each county's contribution to the army's numbers needs to be examined. As the differing rates of desertion indicate, the units from different counties often reacted very differently to the campaign's wear and tear, with numerical trends resulting that often varied from both the other shire units and from what was occurring for the army generally.

The general impression from reading the pay records for Yorkshire is that of generalized confusion and unwillingness to serve from the very start. As mentioned previously, the Yorkshire levies suffered tremendous losses due to desertion before ever reaching the muster at Carlisle. The image of disarray for the York contribution

⁶⁶ *Liber Quot*, p 243-5

⁶⁷ *Liber Quot*, p 249-54

is accentuated by the multiplicity of units that are accounted for in the wardrobe book individually to begin with. Unlike other counties such as Nottingham and Derbyshire with a single unit of archers from each, or Lancashire with two separate units coming from ‘diverse parts’ and from Blackburnshire, seven separate groups of Yorkshiresmen appear to be receiving pay before they are combined for the June 28th-July 1st pay period.⁶⁸

While the largest number of men from York under pay was 3,614 on June 25th, their numbers did not stabilize until the July 2nd-5th pay period. At this point, 3,116 archers and 26 constables were paid via Richard de Rotheclive⁶⁹ - only three-fifths of what Edward had requested for troops of the county during the campaign. Other constables who would be listed as collecting the main county force’s pay were Richard Collington, Paul Keteler, Reynard de Couton, Henry Clerk, Roger Turceys, Thomas de Langele, Gilbert de Quikx, Edmund de Wateby, Robert de Lasceles, John de Leek, John de Whytehundes, Henry de Lascy, Nicholas de Hoperton, Robert de Puscly, and Richard Wakefield. Roger Sheffield and John Lefaunt are notably listed as constables ‘discoopertis’ – lacking barding for their horses, and thus receiving only half a shilling a day⁷⁰.

The force under the command of these men would shrink from its high of over three thousand steadily over time, losing approximately four hundred men every five days. Small groups were still catching up with the main body up until during the siege at Caerlaverock, as the slight increase in numbers recorded during muster at siege’s end showed⁷¹. However, the loss of so many troops from what was easily the largest contingent – roughly a third of the entire army – necessitated requests for

⁶⁸ *Liber Quot*, p 243-4

⁶⁹ *Liber Quot*, p 245

⁷⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 252 is one example

⁷¹ *Liber Quot*, p 247

further reinforcements from the county to replace the losses by the end of July. Letters patent issued at Kircudbright on July 27th appointed commissioners to bring a further 4,900 men from York. Again he was to be disappointed, as the unit only had 650 men in it upon entering the payroll on its leaving the county. It had been reduced to 407 archers under Benedict de Stubbe and seven other constables by the time it joined the army in Scotland on August 21st and the remaining 723 archers from the county. By the 25th, even these fresh troops had lost half of their remaining numbers⁷².

Westmoreland provided an even more dismal picture of desertion and lack of military discipline. Initially, the county provided a good portion of the thousand requested from it – by the time of Caerlaverock, 740 troops are serving under pay, with Robert Strickland, Henry de Burgh, John Darley, Thomas Forester, Willam de Burdale, John Avenal, and Roger de la Ovisine all being named as constables. These numbers take an amazing plunge in late July, however, with the number of Westmoreland troops being reduced from 503 at the July 27th muster to only 56 by August 3rd!⁷³ From this point on, the Westmoreland contingent is statistically insignificant except by its absence.

Cumberland fared better than Westmoreland did, though it still lost 324 of 676 soldiers during the same period of the latter county's desertion *en masse*. Unfortunately, it never came close to providing the same percentage of its requested totals as its fellow border county with its 953 men, just under half of the requested total. Overall, its depletion rates were rather constant, ranging from fifty to one hundred men a week. Constables named in the pay records included William

⁷² CPR 1292-1301, p 529; *Liber Quot*, p 253-4

⁷³ *Liber Quot*, p 248, 246, 252-3

Egremont, John de Bello-loco, John Friston, Ade Levington, Richard le Bret, and William de Peintor.⁷⁴

Cheshire and Nottinghamshire showed similar patterns to each other, in that their contingents were notable more for their experience from the Welsh Wars than for their proximity to the conflict. In fact, Cheshire was not included at all in the writs to the northern counties, though Nottinghamshire was with the request for 1,500 soldiers from its lands⁷⁵. The small size of the Cheshire contingent, 333 men at its greatest is similar to the 365 soldiers from Ireland, and are likely units requested by the crown from the sheriff or other royal officials in the area rather than from the county as a whole. Nottinghamshire never managed more than 583 soldiers, not even two-fifths of its requested contribution⁷⁶.

John Bradley, John Milverton, and William de Swetenham served as the Cheshire constables, while Robert de Touthorp, John Langer, Henry de Staneye, William Hay, and William de Bikerton commanded the Nottingham contingents⁷⁷. Both county units maintained good form throughout July, losing less than 150 men between them before the 3rd of August, thanks to some otherwise unmentioned reinforcements about the 23rd of July. By the time of the next muster, however, both groups had been halved, to 167 and 206 soldiers respectively.

Derbyshire, unfortunately, suffered a twenty-percent higher rate of troop loss than did its partner in the pay records, Nottingham. Initially, the numbers are equal with those of the other county, with 577 recorded for the first day of June 26th, as opposed to Nottingham's 576 on June 24th. Beginning with a nose dive of over one hundred in the next day, however, the forces under Richard Walkelin, Robert Dale,

⁷⁴ *Liber Quot*, p 248

⁷⁵ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 529

⁷⁶ *Liber Quot*, p 249, 246

⁷⁷ *Liber Quot*, p 249, 246, 252

Richard Shirley, and Roger de Petling shrunk immediately to roughly one hundred soldiers less than the fellow Midlands county. Derby from this point on mirrored the drops in the Nottinghamshire contingent from then on with the gap widening further on July 23rd due to the Nottingham reinforcements and a further forty men being removed from the Derby payroll⁷⁸.

Northumberland proved to be the tardiest of the county units, with the first 266 men not appearing on the pay rolls until the 7th of July. The last of the major initial contingents brought its manpower up to 904 men for the pay period beginning on the 16th of that same month. This lack of timeliness seems to have had an unexpected offshoot, as the numbers for this contingent remained relatively steady, dipping to 836 for the July 27th muster and only dropping to 802 by August 3rd. While following the standard trend of not providing anything close to the amount of troops initially requested, the county's contingent does carry through to the end well, with its 583 men numbering just behind the army's largest contingent from York and the steadiest of the large forces, Lancashire⁷⁹.

Second behind Northumberland in getting its troops to the host in Scotland was Lancashire. The units from this county came either from the Earl of Lincoln's liberties such as Blackburnshire, or from 'diverse parts' unspecified in the pay records. While 300 archers from Blackburnshire were with the host as early as June 27th, significant numbers from the county would not arrive until July 5th, when 987 archers and 10 constables joined up with the host⁸⁰. By the July 16th-22nd muster period, 1610 troops were under the Lancashire constables such as Peter Preston, Ade

⁷⁸ *Liber Quot*, p 244, 245, 251

⁷⁹ *Liber Quot*, p 250, 252-3, 255

⁸⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 244

de Hescarth, William Caldicott, and William Livesey⁸¹, providing eighty percent of the requested manpower from the county.

The Lancashire levies would also prove more stable than most, losing only thirty-five percent of its manpower from July 16th to August 3rd. In fact, it would prove to be the only unit able to maintain more than a thousand men in the field at this time, as the Yorkshire levies had shrunk to 743 men in the meantime. This situation persisted until the arrival on the 15th of August of new troops from Yorkshire. The same letters patent that requested new troops from Yorkshire also specified 1,000 new troops to be brought up from Lancashire, though the wardrobe book does not indicate any new troops from the county arriving after the writs were issued.⁸²

Staffordshire and the contingent of soldiers from Ireland carry through the campaign remarkably well. But for the loss of one hundred soldiers between the July 27th and August 3rd musters for the Staffordshire contingent, neither of the two units suffered any serious loss of manpower. Their relative small size, much like Cheshire, would seem to be a reflection of the nature of their recruitment, the lack of proximity to the conflict to force the choice of quantity over quality, and the resulting better quality of soldiers chosen. Neither unit exceeded four hundred men, with Richard and John de Ballybin of Ireland commanding 365 and Richard Leghton and Robert Langdon 198 men during the siege of Caerlaverock⁸³.

While the forces from the northern counties were less than exemplary in their staying power, the units provided by the garrisons at Roxburgh, Lochmaben, and Berwick were proving to be remarkable for their coherency. Where six separate counties had been cut in at least half during less than a month's time, the three garrison forces suffered only a fourteen percent reduction, with eighty-six of 621 men

⁸¹ *Liber Quot*, p 249

⁸² *Liber Quot*, p 249, 252, 254; *CPR 1292-1301*, p 530

being cut from the payroll during the same period⁸⁴. Presumably this was due to the more professional and permanent nature of the garrison, as opposed to the county troops which had been called up away from their farms and families.

The call-up of garrison forces to join the host seems to have been a reaction to the continuing problems of desertion. The crown was faced with the need to replace the missing troops with men that would be able to quickly join the host and would not be as likely to leave without license as the men that were being replaced. Four hundred soldiers from Lochmaben arrived with the host by July 7th, followed by 104 from Roxburgh on the 10th and 741 from Berwick by the 23rd⁸⁵. While this provided much needed stability and bulk to the royal army, it also was a serious drain on the garrisons protecting the English-held territories in the south of Scotland, as this meant over a thousand troops being drawn off into Galloway despite the problems still threatening the east.

The crown was certainly aware of the heavy loss of troops going absent without leave, and expressed its displeasure with legal action taken against those who had left the army. The large-scale desertions from the Yorkshire contingents, the most sizeable of those comprising the army, was also noticed. As early as July 15th, letters patent were issued appointing Robert de Boulton, Peter Becard and Ralph de Dalton to arrest deserters in Yorkshire and confiscate their possessions⁸⁶. Other counties also were the targets of such inquiries, often with the initial commissioners of array assigned to find the men that they had initially recruited – John de Swyneburn in Northumberland being one example⁸⁷

⁸³ *Liber Quot*, p 252-3, 248

⁸⁴ *Liber Quot*, p 249-53

⁸⁵ *Liber Quot*, p 247-8, 253

⁸⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 527-8; *CFR 1272-1307*, p 433-4

⁸⁷ *CFR 1272-1307*, p 434

One important facet of the various writs issued to deal with the desertion was the precise wording of the responsibilities of those assigned to conduct the inquiry. They were not only find those guilty of desertion, but to also find the bailiffs and other local officials who accepted bribes or in other fashions aided and abetted those who were deserting from the army.

While some were becoming criminals in deserting the army, others were attempting to achieve the opposite. Convicts did serve in the Scottish campaign for pardons, though the exact number is unknown. Certainly pardons were issued to a number of men for assorted crimes due to their service. Richard Lespenser the elder, Richard Lespenser the younger, and William Lespenser received pardon for the death of John de Hoton⁸⁸; Robert de Foxholes for the manslaughter of William de Hoton; and William de la Chaumbre of Spenithorn for the death of Richard Spave.⁸⁹ The use of felons as soldiers in return for pardons had serious implications for law enforcement and as providing a known means for criminals to evade more serious punishments.

Hand in hand with determining the numbers of infantry is figuring the costs incurred in maintaining them. As previously discussed, infantry receive 2d a day, their *vintenars* 4d, and the constables either 6d or a shilling a day depending on their equipment. Though these numbers are relatively slight per man, they quickly add up when dealing with several thousand infantry, each drawing their few pence per day. From the period of June 24th until September 5th, the infantry and their officers cost the crown £3787 14s 8d in wages, ranging from the large amount of £1096 13s 4d paid out to troops from Yorkshire to the minor £121 3s 4d paid to soldiers from Cheshire.

⁸⁸ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 539

⁸⁹ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 541

Chapter 4: Cavalry

Beginning in late December, writs began to be issued calling upon the tenants-in-chief of England to provide the cavalry forces Edward planned to use during the summer campaign⁹⁰. Through these and other sources that shall be examined, the king intended to form the large cavalry force necessary as part of an army for campaigning in Scotland. The size, composition, and cost of the cavalry, much like the infantry, reflect the resources that Edward could call upon and the crown's ability to tap them.

The records for this campaign are problematic. On one hand, they give complete details as to two major components of the forces serving on horseback. From what we have, we can be sure of the exact numbers serving in the household as paid troops and those provided as the feudal quotas owed by the tenants-in-chief for the campaign that year. We know when they served, and in what numbers. If they are redeeming owed service, we know who for, and the amount of service owed. If they are paid, we know their rank, their pay both per day and in total, and often even what other garrison in Scotland they had been serving in before joining up with the main host.

Beyond these particular cavalymen, there is no data beyond the occasional allusion to them in terms of their horses, either in the horse list compiled for the campaign or in the expenses incurred in replacing them listed in the appropriate section of the wardrobe book for that year. We have evidence that a rather large part of the army's mounted half was neither household troops or serving feudal quotas, thanks to their being mentioned in *The Song of Caerlaverock*, a heraldic poem written

⁹⁰ *Parl Writs*, I, p 347

as the Roll of Arms for this campaign by an unknown herald. Unfortunately, the Song is sadly lacking in numbers other than for those bannerets and other highest-ranking members of the army.

The best evidence we have is for the household cavalry; those paid elements receiving funds directly from the crown for their service during the year and specifically, the campaign. With the wardrobe book for the year surviving in its entirety, we can be assured that not only do we have the complete record of men serving for pay during that year, we also do not have cavalry serving elsewhere in the royal administration funded from sources such as the exchequer.

Two separate sections from the wardrobe book directly deal with the mounted forces. The first section, entitled *Feoda Et Vadia Banerettorum, Militum, Etc.*, is the list of men of banneret or knight rank taken into service during the year. The first half of this section is dedicated to individuals and their payment for serving for half-year periods listed as either winter (*hiemali*) or summer (*estivali*). Bannerets received £6 13s. 4d. for a six-month period, while knights received half that for the same period, £3 6s. 8d. Several entries are recorded as *nichil*, not receiving any payment for being enrolled during that same period. However, all of these are listed as serving in one of the various royal garrisons in Scotland, Edinburgh and Lochmaben figuring most prominently⁹¹.

The second part of this section is that which is of the most importance for the campaign, as it records the pay of the various household bannerets and knights in receipt of fees and/or robes and their retinues for their service in the Scottish campaign. A standard entry would read as such:

Domino Eustachio de la Hacche, baneretto, pro vadiis suis, trium militum et sex scutiferorum suorum, a 4 die Julii, quo die equi sui fuerunt appreciati, usque

⁹¹ *Liber Quot*, p 192-5

ultimum diem Augusti, utroque computato, per 59 dies, per computum factarum cum eodem apud Dumbrou [Drumburgh] ultimo die Augusti - £47 4s. 0d.⁹²

First, the household member would be listed followed by their rank – in the example above, Lord Eustache de l’Hacche, serving as banneret. In most cases, the lord listed as head of each retinue would be serving in person on the campaign at the head of their contribution to the war effort. There were exceptions to this, such as the two knights and five squires of Simon de Montacute who after July 29th carried on as part of the host without the presence of Montacute himself⁹³.

After naming the contingent leader, the precise number of troops and their ranks would be listed, as well as the beginning of the period for which they were to receive pay. To continue using the example above, l’Hacche is being paid for himself, three knights, and six squires for a pay period beginning on July 4th, the same day the army departed Carlisle for Galloway. Any horses being evaluated would be listed – here, the horses for the contingent are listed as being valued for the records. The additional value in this portion of the entry is found especially in more complicated listings, where the size of the retinue changes over time. The names of the new members would be listed and the addition of their horses to the valued lists recorded. Such is the case with Robert Tony and Henry Tieys, two bannerets that join John de St. John’s listed retinue on July 13th⁹⁴.

The pay period’s ending date would then be recorded, alongside the precise number of days being paid for. As with most of the infantry records, the two dates listed as beginning and ending the pay period are included in the count of days – so, July 1st to 3rd, for instance, would be counted as three days. If there were multiple payments to be made to the retinue leader, the record would now include the amount

⁹² *Liber Quot*, p 196

⁹³ *Liber Quot*, p 199

⁹⁴ *Liber Quot*, p 200

paid for the one block of time, then repeat the pattern from the number of troops through the time paid as many times as necessary.

The final statement in the entry would give the method of payment, commonly followed by either the location, the date, or both. Several entries record only the month that the debt was redeemed from the wardrobe, while a large number give no actual date at all for when funds were disbursed. The final total would be recorded, with the amount given in pounds, shilling and pence. These payments would be for precisely the days served by the men of the retinue and nothing else. There is no evidence of the crown making blanket contracts with the retinue leaders of the sort used to supply garrison troops, such as that made with Robert Hastang to garrison Roxburgh for a flat £120 in 1297⁹⁵.

The second section from the wardrobe book pertaining to the household troops is that entitled *Vadia balistariorum Servientum Ad Arma, Scutiferorum, Etc.*, especially its subtitled portion *Vadia Scutiferorum Cum Equis Appreciatis In Guerra Scocie*. This section relates specifically to those of men-at-arms rank serving with the royal household directly, rather than as part of the retinue of one of the bannerets or knights retained by the crown in paid service.

The pattern for each entry is quite similar to that of the *Feoda* section, as one would expect. The most notable difference is in the ranks of those being paid. The two groups listed in the *Scutifer* segment of the wardrobe accounts are *scutifers*, squires, *serviens*, sergeants, or *vallettis*, valets or grooms. For our purposes, they are essentially the same, as both are paid the same amount as the *scutiferorum* from the *Feoda*, and have no other differentiation made between them other than the title. For

⁹⁵ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 74

most cases where differentiating the various types of men paid in this section is unnecessary, the term ‘men-at-arms’ will be used.

The type of men serving as men-at-arms also varied in background. Some never gained knighthood, remaining in service as squires throughout their term, while others were sons of the aristocracy. Piers Gaveston served as a squire during this campaign, following the footsteps of his father Arnold, a banneret in Edward’s service⁹⁶. Others were sergeants, long-term career soldiers not aspiring to knighthood. These men, listed alongside sons in training such as Piers, were men like Adam Carbonel, whose main service was the leading of infantry forces as constables⁹⁷.

Also notable about this section is the inclusion of garrison troops from Lochmaben, Roxburgh, Berwick, and Jedburgh. These troops are all of men-at-arms rank, with a constable being identified by garrison, followed by the men in his charge. However, the constables in charge of these cavalry groups receive the same pay as their men⁹⁸. These must have been requested as part of a general draw on the garrison’s troops to bolster the army, as the garrisons at Lochmaben, Roxburgh, and Berwick all also sent large numbers of infantry to swell the ranks.

However, the infantry and cavalry from each of these three garrisons start being entered into the wardrobe payrolls at different times, which would seem to indicate that their joining the army as quickly as possible was more important than travelling as a single body. The cavalry for Roxburgh and Berwick began receiving pay on July 4th and 18th respectively, while the infantry were enrolled on the 10th and 23rd, both showing a five or six day delay between the pay of the cavalry and that of the infantry. Lochmaben shows a different trend, with the cavalry beginning on the 10th, three days after the infantry’s joining on the 7th. Of the three garrisons,

⁹⁶ *Liber Quot*, p 229, 200

⁹⁷ Carbonel was constable for the infantry from the Roxburgh garrison; *Liber Quot*, p 222;

Lochmaben was the only one to be visited during the campaign by the army. It is during this visit that the infantry from Lochmaben were taken up into the army, eliminating the delays caused by having to travel westward to join the royal host and explaining the disparity in enrolment times⁹⁹.

The pay rates for mounted men were quite standardized all throughout this period. Bannerets in royal service would receive four shillings per day, knights two shillings, and men-at-arms one shilling. All of the household cavalry appear to have been using horses with barding. Neither the *Feoda* nor the *Scutiferorum* section of the wardrobe book make mention of cavalry serving without barded horses. Had there been such, they likely would have been paid six pence per day, as that was the amount paid to constables of the infantry such as Roger Sheffield listed as having uncovered horses (*equis discoopertis*)¹⁰⁰. These pay rates seem to have been used more by convention or tradition than by any reflection of the actual costs involved. The well-known example of Robert de Sapy contracting to provide the bishop of Salisbury with five knights for £100 in 1322 would suggest that ten shillings a day per knight was much more appropriate¹⁰¹.

Taken together, the two sections cover the household troops available during the campaign. In essence, the separation into two distinct parts is more for ease of accounting than any true difference in the type or duration of service being carried out. While Prestwich refers to the bannerets and knights listed in the *Feoda* section as ‘permanent household’ and those from the *Scutiferorum* as ‘temporary troops’¹⁰², no such dichotomy is evident from the pay records themselves. In fact, many of the men-

⁹⁸ *Liber Quot*, p 220-2, 231

⁹⁹ *Liber Quot*, (Roxburgh) p 222, 248; (Berwick) p 221, 253; (Lochmaben) p 231, 248

¹⁰⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 246

¹⁰¹ Prestwich, M.C. ‘Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England’, in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.B. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), p 149

¹⁰² *Edward I*, p 485

at-arms serving individually carry out longer terms of service in the field than those higher-ranking individuals with retinues¹⁰³.


Appendix 2 gives a day-by-day accounting of the royal household's strength in the field during essentially the same period examined earlier in this work: June 25th until September 5th. Following the pattern of the wardrobe clerks, I have kept the *Feoda* and *Scutiferorum* sections separated in the analysis, rather than combine them, while further segmenting the *Scutiferorum* to reflect individual contracts and the garrison troops on campaign recorded there. It is important to keep the distinction between those brought into the household as part of the specific retinue of a banneret or knight and those who contracted individually with the crown for pay as individuals or small groups of rarely more than four men. Doing this also takes advantage of the simplified accounting referred to earlier, with the data from the *Feoda* section labelled as 'Retinues', while those from the *Scutiferorum* portion are labelled as 'Individuals' or 'Garrisons', as appropriate.

The commonly quoted figure for the household forces during this campaign is 522 'permanent household' troops and a total number of 'some 850 men'¹⁰⁴. While the research supports these numbers as the total number of troops participating as part of the household, they fail to reflect the differing periods of service being carried out by the various bannerets and magnates, and loses any exactness once the men-at-arms and garrison troops are included.

¹⁰³ Compare the 123 days served from July 14th until November 3rd by Henry Teesdale to the 30 days Walter Huntercombe was in the field with his retinue; *Liber Quot*, p 216, 200

¹⁰⁴ *Edward I*, p 485

Household Cavalry #'s and Changes, 1300



The figure above charts two major facets of the household cavalry during this campaign. The first factor it follows are the total numbers of the household itself, including those knights and bannerets with their retinues listed in the *Feoda* section of the wardrobe book and those men-at-arms whose pay is recorded in the *Scutiferorum* portion. The second is the day-to-day changes in numbers of the household, based on the '+/-' entries in Appendix 2. This indicates the net gain or loss of cavalry the household underwent during each day. For example, from June 30th to July 1st, the household increased in size from 95 soldiers to 142. This net gain of 47 men is duly shown on the chart. This provides an easy tool for seeing trends in large numbers of men either being enrolled or released from the household.

Three phases dominate the pattern of rises and falls in the number of household troops. The first was the initial gathering in of troops for the campaign at Carlisle, and was as expected characterized by a rapid increase in the number of household troops

with Edward. June 25th sees 70 troops with Edward, including three of his bannerets – John de St. John, John de Botetorte, and William le Vavassur. Botetorte must have arrived with the king, having been receiving pay since June 17th. Both St. John and Vavassur were already at Carlisle, the former having been preparing for the campaign there for some months while the latter had arrived with the Yorkshire levies on or around the same date as the king¹⁰⁵.

After this point the number of troops increased rapidly until July 8th, as troops filtered into the muster or caught up with the army, moving at the infantry's pace into Scotland. After reaching 438 troops on the 8th, the pace of new cavalry arrivals slackened temporarily, dropping from 28 a day to four from the 9th until the 13th, which saw 81 enrolled in the single day. The jump is mostly artificial, coming at the end of the likely period during which the siege of Caerlaverock would have been carried out. The fighting would have delayed the enrolment of many of the troops arriving until after the siege. With this consideration in mind, the period of expansion continued on through until July 15th.

This pattern diverges widely from that of the infantry, however. Where the infantry forces peaked during the siege of Caerlaverock and then rapidly began to erode, the household cavalry had not yet reached its apex. July 15th, the date of departure from Caerlaverock, saw 584 cavalry recorded in the wardrobe book as with the king. These numbers would continue to grow at a steady rate through July until the middle of August. By August 12th, the household had reached its largest proportion for the campaign at 728 men in service, while the infantry had dissolved from a high of 9220 on July 15th to 5110 men one month later.


¹⁰⁵ For Botetorte, *Liber Quot*, p 201; St. John, *CPR 1292-1301*, p 484 and *Liber Quot*, p 200; Vavassur, *CPR 1292-1301*, p 512 and *Liber Quot*, p 208

This period, the first half of the second phase of the household's strength was not characterized by a rapid growth in numbers. The largest jump was a net increase of 28 men on July 28th, due to the arrival of additional men for the retinues of Roger Clifford and Roger de Mortimer¹⁰⁶. In fact, the entire period from July 15th until August 26th, though arcing from 584 men to 728 before declining to 682 troopers, is notable more for the lack of change than anything else. This resistance to attrition and desertion can be attributed to the lack of engagements with the Scots and with the more professional nature of the men making up the household in comparison with the infantry levies that proved so hard to maintain the numbers of.

Once past this point in time, we see the dispersal of the household forces as the campaign draws to a close. Without the need for the services of a large household force, the expense of maintaining such a force becomes prohibitive, and therefore the release of many of the soldiers made sound financial sense to a crown needing to pay close attention to its finances. Some forces are maintained – by the September 5th cut-off for this analysis, 314 were still on the payroll. 123 were maintained until November 3rd, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this represents the 'peacetime' or off-season requirements for household troops.

¹⁰⁶ *Liber Quot*, p 197, 202

% Retinues during Galloway Campaign, 1300



Throughout the campaign, the largest percentage of the household troops were the bannerets and knights of the household and their individual retinues. This was due in part to the greater financial resources of the higher-ranking members of the household troops and to the advantages to the household of having each individual banneret and knight involved in recruiting their own following on their own. Not only did this simplify finding the necessary men for the campaign, it also simplified the payroll records, as each retinue leader received the pay for his following and was responsible in turn for paying each individual member according to whatever contracts had been decided between them.

Initially, the retinues of household knights and bannerets provided the vast majority of the household cavalry – roughly ninety-three percent before the beginning of July. After this point, the percentage drops significantly with the wholesale induction of men into the household, either in retinues or not. The ratio stabilizes at

seventy percent by July 8th, and remains steady throughout the rest of the campaign until the end of August, where the wholesale release of troops from the household makes the large, expensive retinues the most cost-effective portion of the household to slash. After this point in time, the ratio dropped drastically to fewer than fifty percent of the much-reduced household troop.


Looking at the retinues of the 24 individuals of banneret or equivalent rank¹⁰⁷, there is an average of just over 13 individuals per retinue. The figures that make up this average vary widely, however, from the three bannerets, 12 knights, and 64 squires in John de St. John's retinue from July 20th until August 29th to the four squires that are the entire contribution of Arnold Gaveston¹⁰⁸. The average of thirteen is well known, having been quoted as early as J.E. Morris's work on the Welsh Wars¹⁰⁹. The knights leading retinues, however, are usually ignored due to the small sizes of their followings. Of the 36 knights recorded leading retinues, only seven have knights other than themselves in the retinue. Of these, only John de Champvent and the retinue sent by John de Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe had three or more total knights. The 36 knightly retinues averaged roughly 3.5 men-at-arms between them, ranging from Droxford's six knights and 22 squires to numerous individuals such as Richard Marshal, accompanied by only one squire¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁷ Walter Beauchamp is listed as seneschal, though no other differentiation is made: *Liber Quot*, p 195

¹⁰⁸ *Liber Quot*, p 200

¹⁰⁹ Morris, J.E. *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, p 299

¹¹⁰ *Liber Quot*, p 202-3, 206



The other portions of the household forces do not follow the trends in manpower that the retinues from the *Feoda* section and the total household numbers do. The changes in the numbers of men-at-arms in the *Scutiferorum* section do not break into easily identified phases. Instead, their numbers increase in a reasonably smooth curve, steep at first and then levelling off, from the beginning of July on through until the same peak period as the overall numbers. August 12th has 166 men receiving pay, a far cry from the 504 making up the retinues from the *Feoda*. After this point is a decline similar in form to the increases previous to mid-August, gently lowering the numbers to 138 on August 29th before steepening to lower the total to 110 on September 5th. While some characteristics of the retinue trends, such as the artificial pause caused by the siege at Caerlaverock, do show up in this curve, none of the jagged upswings and downswings seen in retinue numbers carries over.

The third group of troops recorded in the payrolls, those from the garrisons in Scotland brought into the army to boost numbers, do not follow any sort of curve at

all. All four groups of men from the garrisons retain their numbers throughout nearly all the campaign, with the loss of three men total from the Roxburgh records being the only noticeable downswing. While the steadiness of the garrison troops is exemplary, they certainly did not form the bulk of the household – the largest number serving at any point were sixty men during August.

Though not separately identified, mention should be made of the attempt to expand the numbers liable to knightly service and their effect on the numbers in the household. While Edward had limited himself to the strict feudal summons to the magnates, he did set up commissions to list all those holding forty librates or more of land for summoning to royal service in the campaign. This attempt to use a wealth qualification for service, similar to earlier attempts in the reign, generated opposition to the non-feudal nature of its requirements. Though the commissions did carry through their assignment, there is no evidence for pressure to serve being exerted on those named, and this type of summons was not used again during Edward's reign¹¹¹.

Keeping such large numbers of men under arms as part of the royal household was a costly affair for the crown to undertake, especially in conjunction with all of the other expenses accruing due to the campaign. Tracking the costs of the retinues is relatively simple, as there are no departures from the standard 4s/2s/1s pay structure for the various ranks and the number of days listed. For the period from June 25th until September 5th, keeping the various retinues listed in the *Feoda* cost the wardrobe £1,866 7s.

The wages from the *Scutiferorum* portion of the wardrobe are more difficult to tabulate, due to many of the men being paid having reductions being made in their wages and listed on the Marshal's Roll, which has not survived. Presumably, these

¹¹¹ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 88; *Parl Writs*, p 330

deductions are due to prests previously paid out to allow for the costs of preparing for the campaign, though the lack of the Marshal's Roll or any other evidence leaves no method to prove whether this is the case. The wages that are listed, however, are rather reduced even in comparison to the symbolic one shilling a day most of those in the *Scutiferorum* section received – where Richard Jersey should receive 74s. for his services, the reduction listed in the payroll brings the total down to 46s. 3d., just over three-fifths of the standard¹¹². The 'vanilla', or anticipated set of wages disregarding any deductions for prests, would come to £614 11s. for the same June 25th to September 5th period, and are noted in Appendix 2.

Additionally, the crown was responsible for providing compensation for horses killed or rendered unusable during the campaign. These were recorded in an additional section outside of the *Feoda* or *Scutiferorum* portions of the wardrobe, entitled *Donis, Restauro Equorum, Etc.* This portion of the wardrobe book covered gifts, horse restorations, and other similar compensations. Nearly £2000 was paid out to replace horses lost on the campaign, a sizeable addition to the costs of the cavalry beyond their wages¹¹³.

Along with vastly increasing the size of the household for the campaign, Edward drew on the other sources of manpower that the political scene and the accepted obligations of the magnates would allow. December saw the issue of a strict feudal summons, the most traditional call for service available to the crown¹¹⁴. The political difficulties of previous years, especially that of 1297, had made attempts to summon service from tenants in any but the most accepted forms an uncertain business¹¹⁵

¹¹² *Liber Quot*, p 228

¹¹³ *Liber Quot*, p 155-187; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 175

¹¹⁴ *Parl Writs*, I, p 347

¹¹⁵ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 85-9

The number of men that served in response to the feudal summons certainly was not the large force that would have assembled under a similar summons two centuries beforehand. Those that did answer the summons were recorded in the Constable's Roll taken by Humphrey de Bohun. This document recorded the tenant-in-chief for whom the service was being proffered, the number and type of men responding, and the exact amount of service being owed and carried out.

Forty knights and 366 squires responded to carry out the service owed, though almost entirely by proxy. Of the magnates owing service, only three – John Hastings, Hugh le Despencer, and Ralph de Monthermer, by courtesy titled the earl of Gloucester – actually served in person¹¹⁶. Most detached members of their retinue to carry out the service, with two men-at-arms equalling one knight as was customary in accounting the service as carried out. The amount of service listed varied dramatically, from large numbers such as the fifteen knights sent by the Earl of Cornwall to the single squire serving eight days to clear William de Cantilupo's feudal quota¹¹⁷. One individual, Hugh de St. Philibert, should not have been included at all, as he was receiving pay at the same time as a member of John de Droxford's household retinue¹¹⁸.

The Constable's Roll is normally taken directly at face value and considered as the whole list of men serving out the owed service requested as part of the feudal summons issued by Edward. However, there is some evidence, though ambiguous, that the Constable's Roll may not be complete. On July 14th at Caerlaverock, Nicholas Segrave, lieutenant to the Constable, attested that both Robert Malest and Henry de Middleton were serving 'in person' in Scotland with the host, and that Middleton was

¹¹⁶ *Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland*, I, ed. F. Palgrave (1837), p 209-31

¹¹⁷ *Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland*, I, ed. F. Palgrave (1837), p 210, 223

¹¹⁸ *Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland*, I, ed. F. Palgrave (1837), p 225; *Liber Quot*, p 202

even carrying the king's banner. Segrave made a third attestation of service in person for Simon Manchester on August 18th at Twynholm, in the same form as the previous two declarations¹¹⁹. It seems most likely that these are directly related to feudal service, otherwise the service 'in person' would not be stressed, nor would the lieutenant of the lord responsible for recording feudal service be made responsible as opposed to a household officer. While adding two knights and a squire to the feudal levy, the lack of any large number of similar entries would point to the numbers in the Constable's Roll being reasonably accurate and only requiring minor alteration.

With the restriction of forty days' service required on feudal service and the unwillingness of the magnates to serve for pay under the king during a royal campaign, the options open to the crown were very few. Edward had to rely on what amounted to the magnates' largesse in being willing to remain in the field beyond the period required by the feudal summons, and their willingness to bring more soldiers as part of their retinue than was required of them. Attached to the feudal summons that had been sent out in December was the request that those summoned bring as many men-at-arms as they could provide.

This request, appealing as it did to the notion of the responsibility to serve rather than the obligation to respond to the summons paid off handsomely and was responsible for the majority of the cavalry available for the campaign¹²⁰. Out of the eighty-seven bannerets named in the *Song of Caerlaverock*, twenty-three were receiving pay and three were serving their quota in person. The remaining fifty-one bannerets were thus at Caerlaverock on a voluntary basis. Assuming that these individuals had retinues averaging the same thirteen in number per banneret as those of the household, it is likely that at least 600 men-at-arms were with the army at these

¹¹⁹ *CDS*, ii, 1145, 1146, 1150

¹²⁰ *Parl Writs*, p 327

magnate's expense. Even those who were serving their feudal dues in person, such as the earl of Gloucester, were not likely to be content with the bare minimum required of them by their owed service. Beyond these very rough figures, we cannot make any further estimates of the size of the cavalry forces, as we simply do not have any data to go on. Taking the household, the feudal levy, and the estimated number of non-feudal men-at-arms with the army, Edward likely had somewhere between 1500 and 1800 cavalry during the siege of Caerlaverock, and 1800 to 2000 cavalry at the peak of mid-August.

While touching on the cavalry, we should also look at the crown's sources of revenue directly relating to this body of soldiers: fines and scutage. The levying of scutage was an issue of contention between the crown and the magnates, as the basis for this exaction of funds was a level of owed service that had not been in use since before Edward's coronation or even the baronial wars of his youth. During the course of the thirteenth century, the size of feudal quotas were heavily cut due to the increasing costs of the equipment necessary for a knight and the increasing burdens of the administrative duties carried out by this class of the aristocracy. There was no formal process for carrying out these reductions, but the process of gradual change appeared to be completed by Henry III's Welsh campaign in 1245¹²¹.

Along with these reductions, the process of using scutage as a set monetary penalty per knight owed also fell by the wayside. It was essentially replaced by the use of fines whose amounts were arbitrarily set by the crown, usually at higher rates per owed soldier than the twenty or forty shillings that had been common with scutage. This reflected both the increasing costs of keeping knights or the equivalent two men-at-arms in the field and the need for a simpler system of getting money from

¹²¹ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 78-9

those not serving that did not require intense calculations based on how fees were distributed and to whom.

Such a fine was levied in 1300, at the surprisingly high level of £40 a knight. Considering the failure of the attempted winter campaign to attract any magnate support and Edward's reduction to the strict feudal summons to gather cavalry troops that were not voluntary, the level of the fine must have been intended to convince as many as possible to serve in person. Chew gives the total amount garnered in fines as £1975 6s. 8d., just over 49 fees' worth.

Despite having levied fines for nonparticipation in the 1300 campaign, Edward went ahead in 1305 with a levying of scutage on all those owing him service during that campaign, whether or not they served. The disparity between the old feudal quotas and the new was the justification used by the Exchequer throughout Edward's reign. As with other attempts to collect funds on this basis, this incidence failed to produce more than £400 for the royal exchequer¹²². Despite their objections and refusals to pay the scutage the crown was attempting to levy, the various magnates carried through in exacting scutage on their own tenants. Prestwich gives the example of the earl of Lincoln collecting scutage from the honour of Pontefract – nearly sixty-three fees paying out £125 18s. 2½d.¹²³

An important consideration regarding fines and scutages for the exchequer is that only a percentage was likely to be paid in during the year of the campaign, let alone during the campaign itself. As mentioned, the scutage was first agreed to in 1305, half a decade after the campaign was fought. The fines, too, were delayed,

¹²² Chew, H.M. 'Scutage under Edward I', *EHR* 37 (1922), p 321-5, 335

¹²³ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 82

despite orders to the county sheriffs to distrain the property of tenants who were late in paying¹²⁴.

Once in the field, the cavalry forces were split up into four separate squadrons, with the bannerets in each listed in detail by the author of the *Song of Caerlaverock*. The first two squadrons were headed by Humphrey de Bohun, the Constable, and the Earl Warenne. Each had roughly fifteen bannerets with them, including other high-ranking earls such as Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, riding with the Constable, and the earls of Pembroke and Warwick riding with Warenne¹²⁵.

Members of the royal family led the second two squadrons. King Edward headed the third and largest of the squadrons, along with most of the household bannerets including William de Grandison, Robert Clifford, Adam Welles, and John Botetorte. The young Prince Edward, on the first military campaign of his career, symbolically led the fourth squadron. However, actual command likely resided with John de St. John¹²⁶.

While the lists would at first seem split into concrete groups, with the crown and household heading the third and fourth squadrons while earls and magnates were serving in the two smaller units, further examination shows that the lines are much more blurred. With Humphrey de Bohun were among others William le Vavassur, one of the most important bannerets in Edward's household and the commissioner of array for Yorkshire. Similarly, magnates such as Hugh le Despenser and Brian FitzAlan were in the king's squadron. The young prince Edward was accompanied not only by his cousins, Thomas and Henry of Lancaster, but also by John Hastings,

¹²⁴ Chew, H.M. 'Scutage under Edward I', *EHR* 37 (1922), p 333

¹²⁵ *Song of Caerlaverock*, p 5-21

¹²⁶ *Song of Caerlaverock*, p 23-59

William de Ferrers and the earl of Arundel¹²⁷. Based on this, the assumption must be that the cavalry was integrated into the four squadrons irrespective of whether they were paid household troops, responding to the feudal summons, or voluntarily serving.

¹²⁷ *Song of Caerlaverock*, p 9, 29, 37, 47-55

Chapter 5: Victualling

To keep an army of several thousand in the field, the crown had to ensure that the necessary food supplies were available to the soldiers, or else find the troops either deserting or resorting to theft and pillage to assuage their hunger. Without a doubt, the efforts to deal with this problem provided the main administrative workload for the king's household to deal with. Estimates from the time had one quarter of wheat and two of malt being used by twenty men per week, along with large amounts of meat and fish. Additionally, horses were to be allocated a peck of oats per day¹²⁸. When multiplied by the large numbers participating in the campaign, the sheer size of the task of supplying the needed amounts becomes incredible.

Several methods for feeding and supplying the army were available, with varying advantages and costs involved. The main method the crown had for collecting the supplies that its forces would need in Scotland was through prises or purveyances. Though the term in preferred use changed over time from the former to the latter, both referred to the same process of mandatory sales of food supplies to royal officials at a standard price. Initially, the basis of purveyance was the king's right to force the sale of victuals and transport to his household for its maintenance¹²⁹. Well before Edward's reign, the principle had been extended to include not only the household in its tremendously enlarged wartime state, but the entirety of the army and even garrison forces in a region in a state of war, such as Scotland during the period after 1296. Two examples are Henry II's expedition to Ireland and the Siege of

¹²⁸ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 127

¹²⁹ Maddicott, J.R. *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement*, 1975), p 15

Kenilworth, the latter which gave Edward firsthand experience with prises and their effectiveness¹³⁰.

The usual process when purveyance was carried out across several counties or a national scale was for the local sheriff to work with a clerk sent to oversee and record the purveyances. The methods of determining where and how the prises were taken varied, from the use of local juries to the county court splitting up the amount required from hundred to hundred. It was intended that those purveyed from be left with the means to continue their livelihood, while the poor as well were to be exempted.

Certainly, this system could be abused. Payment often was not made at the time of the prise, and could be years in coming. Equally, the purveyors responsible for taking victuals and other supplies for the crown could keep back a portion of what they took for themselves, much as tax collectors could and did in carrying out their similar roles¹³¹. The clerks in charge of gathering the supplies could be bribed to overlook individuals or institutions, so the wealthy could escape purveyances while the less well off were hit that much harder.

The crown usage of purveyances in itself could be considered an abuse, as the prises were as much used to anticipate revenues as for the supplies themselves. Since purveyance did not require the consent of Parliament, there was nothing to check its use except for popular resistance and the political difficulties that its improper use would bring¹³². The end result was the compromise in the *Articuli super Cartas* from

¹³⁰ Prestwich, *War, Politics, and Finance*, p 118-9

¹³¹ Maddicott, J.R. *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement, 1975)*, p 9

¹³² Maddicott, J.R. *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement, 1975)*, p 18

this campaign, which attempted to restrict purveyances to that needed for the household and any further supplies to come from voluntary loans¹³³.

While money is relatively transportable regardless of where it is collected, the goods taken in purveyance have to be transported to where they are needed. This can entail shipping the materials hundreds of miles, such as during the Scottish Wars. Because of this, most of the purveyances for this and other years came from areas that are close to the border or close to easy modes of transportation for moving the supplies to the border.

The armies and garrisons in Scotland were served by two major stores, where the purveyances from various locations were collected, tallied, stored, and then disbursed to the various garrisons and the army. During most of the Scottish wars, the store at Berwick, taken in 1296 from the Scots, was the major centre of activity. Its position as a port at the mouth of the Tweed River on the east coast made it the most suitable location to ship bulk goods to, thanks to favourable prevailing winds and sea conditions. Also, this made for short journeys from the grain fields of eastern England, where most of the country's produce came from¹³⁴.

With the focus of the 1300 campaign being on the western seaboard and Galloway rather than in the east and the Stirling region, Berwick was unsuitable for supplying the main army due to being a long land journey away. Instead, the store at Carlisle was used as the focus of activity for the year. With its port at Skinburness, it was in good position to receive supplies from the other major area of purveyance for the Scottish wars: Ireland. Also, the store was a short journey away from the English garrisons of Lochmaben and Dumfries, which provided the main bulwark in the west for the English efforts to control the region.

¹³³ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 132

¹³⁴ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 122

Preparations for the campaign's supply began extremely early. The first writs for purveyance were issued on January 17th, over five months before the slated start of the campaign on Midsummer's Day. The supplies requested were impressively large – 7000 quarters of wheat, 8,000 quarters of oats, 4300 quarters of malt, and 1000 quarters of beans and peas from Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Holderness in Yorkshire, and Cheshire. Also included in the request was 500 quarters of salt to come from Yarmouth. Fiona Watson is incorrect in stating Yorkshire did not have any requests for supplies made of it: the January 17th writ specifically asks for 1400 quarters of wheat, 1500 quarters of oats, 1000 quarters of malt, and 300 quarters of beans and peas from the sheriff of the county. These are included in the above totals¹³⁵.

While England provided the bulk of goods for Berwick, Ireland was responsible for providing for the supplies at Carlisle. Writs issued the same day as those to England requested 3000 quarters of wheat, 2000 quarters of oats, 300 tuns of wine, and 10,000 stock-fish to be sent to Skinburness by Midsummer's Day. Additionally, Westmoreland was to ship 300 quarters of oats to the same store, due to its proximity to Cumberland. The sheriffs and officials receiving these writs were instructed to make prompt payment from the receipts of the areas of their responsibilities¹³⁶.

When considering how early the writs for these purveyances were issued, two factors should be kept in mind. The first is that the amount to be collected is sizeable, and making the arrangements for their movement by land or by ship would take time. The second is that the supplies being purveyed were not just for the campaign being

¹³⁵ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 487-8

¹³⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 488

planned in the west of Scotland. They were meant for the support of all of the royal garrisons in Scotland, including garrisons such as Dunbar and Edinburgh that never saw the royal army passing nearby during 1300.

Each county or separately named honour or town was assigned a clerk to oversee the purveyance process during this collection. These clerks were chosen more for knowing the region than any specific speciality in supply, as many of these same clerks are those participating in the selection of infantry for the campaign later in the year. Henry de Craystock, for instance, is made responsible for purveyances in the county of Lancaster by these writs. Later, his name appears in the wardrobe book alongside the infantry levies from Lancaster¹³⁷. Others were sent to Ireland – the justiciar of Ireland was directed to pay Adam de Brom and William de Swindon 2s per day each while supervising the collection of victuals¹³⁸.

Clerks too were important on the receiving end of the purveyance process. At Berwick, Richard de Bromesgrove was receiver of victuals, while Carlisle began the year with Richard of Abingdon as Bromesgrove's counterpart. These men, as well as Abingdon's replacement James Dalilegh, were responsible for the receipt of supplies coming to their stores, as well as their taking the stores and providing and/or selling them to the various garrisons and forces of the English north of the border. That these positions needed to be held by competent, efficient men is demonstrated by Richard Abingdon's change from keeper of victuals to baron of the exchequer in the middle of the regnal year.

Two differing views on the effectiveness of the collection of victuals for this year have been published in the past ten years. One found the level of goods collected

¹³⁷ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 487; *Liber Quot*, p 244

¹³⁸ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 330

to be 'satisfactory', while the other saw the stores as operating 'hand-to-mouth', sending out what supplies were on hand as soon as they were received¹³⁹. The latter, championed by Fiona Watson, points at what are seen as irregularities such as Berwick not having much in the way of wheat or flour in stock, and more beans and peas being sold than existed in the store. While these problems have some basis when taken out of context, another factor exists making this interpretation difficult

The problems of purveyance noted by Watson were eased by a large rollover from the previous year of supplies on hand at the stores. While political problems had killed the possibility of a campaign the summer before and the lack of men responding to the summonses for the winter campaign had put off campaigning for nearly two years, it had not delayed the purveyances of supplies for the planned action. Writs from the winter of 1298 for the summer of 1299 had been issued and duly carried out, despite the unforeseen lack of an army to use a large percentage of the supplies¹⁴⁰. Unfortunately, Watson's figures and graphs seem to indicate some of this rollover was not included in her calculations.


Purveyed at the same time as the victuals from the various counties were transportation for those supplies. Land transport taken as prises, such as carts and the horses to draw them, were recorded alongside the various purveyances of grain, oats, flour, etc¹⁴¹. While the requests for supplies had not been sent to Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, there was purveyance of 11 carts and 34 horses made by the sheriff of the two counties for the purpose of the campaign and duly recorded in the wardrobe book¹⁴². Additionally, the services of the naval craft noted in the *Vadia Nautarum* section of the wardrobe book were mainly used for the transport of supplies

¹³⁹ The first is characterized by Michael Prestwich in *Edward I*, p 486; the latter by Fiona Watson, *Under the Hammer*, p 110-1

¹⁴⁰ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 388

¹⁴¹ *Liber Quot*, p 105-6, 112, 127-9, 135-6

from Ireland and England to the stores and from there to the army in Galloway and the various garrisons by the sea.



In examining the victual totals for Berwick and Carlisle in 1300, I have not found any notable corrections on the totals given by Prestwich in his *War, Politics and Finance* survey. To summarize, Berwick had the equivalent of 4176 quarters of wheat, 2668 quarters of malt, 4739 quarters of oats, 973 quarters of beans, 418 quarters of salt and 734 tuns of wine on hand for use over the year, some left over from the previous year's purveyances. Carlisle, the focus of the army's supply efforts, had 7798 quarters of wheat, 1129 quarters of malt, 7769 quarters of oats, 52 quarters of beans, 22 quarters of salt, and 623 tuns of wine¹⁴³. The large amount of wine in stock at Carlisle reduced the need for brewing ingredients for beer, explaining the low amount of malt in stock at the western store. On average, wheat received 4s 5d per

¹⁴² *Liber Quot*, p 105

quarter from those taking the prises. In total, the purveyances from this year cost £4063 2s. ½d., not the £5063 misprinted by Prestwich¹⁴⁴.

The two differing views alluded to previously depend on the interpretations of the percentage of the requested amounts delivered. Though the rollover from the year before distorts the picture we have of the success of these requests, every category listed in the January 17th writs had a return of at least half the total requested. On an absolute scale, receiving only half the amount requested would be a worrisome event. After several years of repeated prises and ongoing war, however, achieving such returns against increasing public resistance and draining of resources is reasonable, if not commendable. Certainly, there were problems. The sheriff of Cambridgeshire's difficulty taking prises, lacking the funds, supplies from Ireland not arriving in Carlisle by Midsummer's day, and a portion of the Irish grain being unusable all bedevilled the crown at one point or another¹⁴⁵. All in all, however, the purveyances were successful in providing the major source of supply for the campaign.

One advantage that purveyed supplies gave the crown was the opportunity to make some profit on the sale of victuals to the soldiers of the army. The prices that the sheriffs were able to take prises at were often well below the true market value. As mentioned, a quarter of grain averaged 4s 5d when taken by prise in England. However, the same quarter of grain when sold to the soldiers on campaign or to the men in garrison could go as high as 10s, though usually averaged about 7s. Despite the large bureaucratic problems and expense incurred by the wardrobe in handling purveyances, there was the additional revenue generated by selling at a profit to help offset the outlays. This revenue could be sizeable – where the victuals cost £4063 to

¹⁴³ *Liber Quot*, p 113-29; Prestwich's data can be found in *War, Politics and Finance*, p 123

¹⁴⁴ *Edward I*, p 487; *Liber Quot*, p 104-136

¹⁴⁵ *Under the Hammer*, p 103-4; CCR 1296-1302, p 401; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 124; the original for the complaint on Irish grain quality is E. 101/547/14

purvey as mentioned earlier, the receipts for food sold this year made over £3000, with revenues of £7290 13s 5d¹⁴⁶.

The crown did not rely solely upon its own resources to make sure the necessary supplies were available for its forces. There was a definite effort to induce merchants to also carry supplies to Scotland and sell them to the men there. Since the wages of the army were meant in part to feed them, it would save the crown considerable expense, effort, and depletion of its stores if large numbers of merchants could be induced to travel with the army and take over this function. The writ for purveyance of supplies from Ireland also ordered ‘...the mayor, bailiffs, and good men of Dublin to induce, admonish, and require, on the king’s behalf, all the merchants of Dublin to bring victuals... for the army at Carlisle.’ Similar writs were sent to other Irish officials such as those at Cork, Drogheda, Waterford, Limerick, Kilkenny, and Rospont.¹⁴⁷ Merchants in the south of England also received similar summonses to Scotland, including a clause warning the sheriff that the king would have to punish him and his goods should merchants not respond to the order¹⁴⁸.

Living off the land was not a viable option for the army. Edward’s position as claiming Scotland as his rightful land meant that he could not engage in any pillaging similar to the *chevauchées* that would be used two generations later during the Hundred Years’ War. Doing so would undermine any popular support his other efforts were garnering and strengthen the opposition to English rule. Even when Edward was willing to allow the army to forage and live off the land, local action often reduced or eliminated the army’s ability to find any significant sources of food. Plans had been made to forage from the cattle herds in Annandale and Galloway, according to Rishanger, but the Scots successfully removed them from beyond the

¹⁴⁶ *Liber Quot*, p 8-13; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 127-8

¹⁴⁷ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 488

reach of the English forces, leaving them hungry¹⁴⁹. Combined with the paucity of agriculture in Scotland compared with the heartland of England or France, these activities meant that local supplies could not be depended on to provide any significant portion of the necessary victuals for the army.

¹⁴⁸ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 400

¹⁴⁹ *Rishanger*, p 439-40

Chapter 6: Naval Activity

As with the other campaigns during the Scottish wars, having a sufficient naval force available was a definite goal of the crown. Previous experience in Scotland had demonstrated how key proper support on sea as well as on land was to a successful campaign, providing lessons that had not gone unheeded. Naval forces in general can provide the major services: direct engagement with enemy naval units, the transportation of troops, and the shipment and carriage of supplies and equipment to the army in the field.

The risk of naval action with the Scots was slight at any time during Edward I's reign, as pointed out by W. Stanford Reid. Though there was some threat from German and French privateering, the Scots themselves lacked the appropriate ports or vessels to undertake any systematic attack upon English ships and vessels.¹⁵⁰ Royal records for 1300 also indicate the presence of a few heavily crewed galleys in royal pay. John L'Skirmisher's galley from Winchelsea with its 26 sailors served from July 10th until September 19th, while two galleys provided by Simon de Montacute with 95 sailors and three constables between them served from May 24th until September 15th.¹⁵¹ The presence of these craft, however few, would certainly provide a deterrent to the individual freebooter on the western seaboard.

While in other years, ships would be necessary for bringing large numbers of troops over from Ireland, 1300 saw little need for the ferrying of manpower to Scotland from the Earl of Ulster. While up to 364 foot and 14 hobelars under John de

¹⁵⁰ Reid, W. Stanford. 'Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', *Mariner's Mirror*, 46 (1960), p 10

¹⁵¹ *Lib. Quot.*, pp 272-9

Ballybin at various times served in the army, no major contingents like those seen in other Scottish campaigns crossed over to Scotland.¹⁵²

The major activity of the English navy during this campaign was the transportation of supplies and equipment, as would their activities in every campaign under Edward in Scotland after the taking of Berwick in 1296. With the inability to feed the army from Scottish sources and difficult terrain and hostile activities of the Scots making land transport impractical, it fell to the navy to keep the soldiers in the field supplied with the purveyances that had been brought to the stores at Berwick and Carlisle.

Nearly all activity was focused at Carlisle, as would be expected with the army staying in the region of Galloway rather than travelling near the east coast. While W. Stanford Reid saw the year's preparations as being the 'most elaborate precautions so far', he overstated the extent, mistaking the request of vessels from the ports between Berwick and Hartlepool as being for the 1300 campaign when their summons for the feast of St. Lucy the Virgin (December 13) coincides with that of the failed winter campaign from Berwick.¹⁵³ The wardrobe accounts for the regnal year show four ships being paid for carrying supplies either to or from Berwick during November and December of 1299, and four vessels from King's Lynn carrying supplies from Berwick to the Firth in August of 1300.¹⁵⁴ The lack of further expenditures on shipping on the east coast adds further doubt to the concept of a second major fleet being assembled for the eastern coast such as was prepared for the west.

The ships for the year fall into two general categories for examination. The first are those that individually operated in the service of the crown from various

¹⁵² *Lib. Quot.*, p 253, 255

¹⁵³ Reid, W. Stanford. 'Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', *Mariner's Mirror*, 46 (1960), p 8; *CPR 1292-1301*, p 455

¹⁵⁴ *Lib. Quot.*, p 271, 279

ports, especially Ireland and the southern and western coasts of England. The second category are those who participated as part of the Cinque Ports' owed service to the crown from the feudal summons issued for the campaign during the summer.

Unfortunately, several of the ships under wages in the wardrobe accounts have no homeport identified, so that such vessels as the *Godeyre*, captained by John son of Benedict, could be from anywhere.

The ships whose origins we can identify provide a varied list geographically. Several come from Ireland – the ports of Carrickfergus, Drogheda, and Ross each have a ship receiving royal wages while Dublin has two listed, the *Godyere* and the *Strethtaile*. Fiona Watson lists Waterford, Youghall, and Cork as also owing ships, though these ports fail to have mention in the paid accounts.¹⁵⁵ Others come from such varied ports as Lyme Regis, Whitehaven, Workington, Chester, Dartmouth, and the Isle of Man.¹⁵⁶ Overall, 24 vessels are directly named in the wardrobe books, including ships from the Cinque Ports not participating in their owed service, such as L'Skirmisher's galley and the *Barge Spiritu Sancti* from Sandwich. Two other entries also list payment for the shipmasters Stephen Banning and John Hurtyng and 45 sailors, though no ship name is given in either entry.¹⁵⁷

The amount of money paid for naval service was standardized on the number of crew per craft, regardless of ship size. Each master received 6d. a day, with 3d. per sailor given whether it had three sailors such as Thomas Lascy's *Sauvey* or 35 as found on the *Barge Spiritu Sancti* under John Hurein's command. The only exception to this were the amounts paid to William L'Ayr and John Gregory, masters of Simon

¹⁵⁵ *Lib. Quot.*, p 272-5; *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1307*, p 106

¹⁵⁶ *Lib. Quot.*, p 272-4

¹⁵⁷ *Lib. Quot.*, p 272-4

de Montacute's two galleys, and the three constables on board them. Each received 9d. per day, rather than the 6d. usual to ship captains.¹⁵⁸

Most records fail to indicate any specific amounts of supplies to be transported from one location to another. There are exceptions, such as the 20 carcasses carried by the *Nicholas* to Caerlaverock in late July and the 173 quarters of grain carried by the *Margaret* of Kihaven and the *Sauvey* of Tengemouth to Kirkudbright from Whitehaven.¹⁵⁹ The usual situation appeared to be carrying supplies from the store at Carlisle via its port at Skinburness to ports in Galloway, Kirkudbright being the most common.

The Cinque Ports squadron provided the most easily identified contingent for the needs of the campaign, and is worth looking at in detail. Rather than having local sheriffs, commissioners, or other royal officials arrange for ships to be sent from them, the Cinque Ports had specific obligations to the crown in terms of ships and manpower in return for freedoms from various taxes and demands. In 1300, the owed service was 57 ships, for 15 days at the ports' own costs. On April 1st, Edward requested that only half the number of ships due be sent to Carlisle by midsummer, provided that the manpower be the same as normally owed.¹⁶⁰

The contingent is notable for the assignment of four captains of the fleet – William Pate and Justin Alard of Wichelsea, William Charles of Sandwich, and John Hall from Dover. Each received 12d. a day, twice that of a normal master of a ship. Above these was Gervase Alard of Winchelsea, the first admiral in English records, receiving 2s. per day.¹⁶¹


¹⁵⁸ *Lib. Quot.*, p 272-3

¹⁵⁹ *Lib. Quot.*, p 273

¹⁶⁰ *CCR 1296-1302*, p 348

¹⁶¹ *Lib. Quot.*, p 277, 279; Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, I, pp 294-5

Cinque Squadron Captains and Home Ports



In total, 30 ships were sent from the ports of Faversham, Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, Romney, Rye, Winchelsea, Hastings, and Pevensey. The numbers provided from each port varied widely, from as many as eight vessels from Dover to only one from Pevensey. Payment records in the wardrobe begin on July 23rd for the squadron, after the assumed fifteen days of unpaid service. The crews appear to be of the size requested by the crown, with the smallest crews such as that under John Mocket on the *Blieth* from Hastings of one constable and nineteen sailors, and the largest two constables and 39 sailors on the *Rose* from Rye, commanded by Reginald Baudethon.¹⁶²

As with the other ships in use by the crown, size was not considered in the amount of payment due each vessel. Each shipmaster received 6d. per day in wages, as did the one or two constables present on every craft – 54 total. The remaining 1011

sailors each were paid 3d. per day, regardless of the size of the vessels they served on. In total, 1100 men received payment as part of the Cinque Port squadron, a minor correction on the 1106 usually reported in other examinations of the campaign.¹⁶³

The costs for the crown in operating the squadron beyond the fifteen days' service owed were considerable. Each day the fleet was off Galloway cost the wardrobe £14 14s. 9d. in wages, not counting the captains of the fleet or the admiral. In total, the service of the officers plus the 60 days from July 23rd to September 20th cost the crown £907 7s.

Excluding the ships used at Berwick in late 1299 and in late August of 1300, a total of £1196 17s. 8d. was spent on a total of 54 ships with crews totalling 1491 men. By September 20th, most naval activity in the region had halted for the year, with the final release of the Cinque Ports squadron from service.

¹⁶² *Lib. Quot.*, p 275

¹⁶³ *Lib. Quot.*, p 275-8; *War, Politics and Finance*, p 143

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Military endeavours of any type are expensive undertakings, though in comparison with the double campaign of the next year, the Caerlaverock campaign was rather mild. From Midsummer's Day until September 5th, the army drew wages of £6268 12s 8d, with an additional £2000 in costs for replacing mounts. The purveyance of victuals cost £4063 2s ½d, while the naval activity to move the victuals cost £1196 17s 8d.

My decision to limit the period of examination has resulted in numbers somewhat differently than those found by researchers examining the entire year and war efforts in Scotland, though perhaps are more precise in terms of the actual costs of the campaign as opposed to the total war effort. In total, £13,528 12s 4½d was spent on the campaign and its preparations, though this includes the collection and transportation of all the victuals for use in Scotland during the year¹⁶⁴. By comparison, the infantry costs for 1301 and its dual campaigns came to £15,746 on its own¹⁶⁵.

However lacking the campaign was in terms of set-piece action or notable results, the consequences of it were important in terms of determining future policy and in terms of the security of western Scotland. As the Caerlaverock campaign was the first campaign after the signal success of Falkirk, the importance both sides must have attached to the outcome was rather high.

The most obvious consequence was the retaking of Caerlaverock by the English. With the removal of the Scots from the castle, the English had secured control of the major fortifications in Annandale and eastern Galloway. Lochmaben

¹⁶⁴ *Liber Quot*, passim

and Dumfries, which had formed a long salient into Scottish-controlled territories, were now secure from assaults from the garrison at Caerlaverock and from being cut off from the main supply line to either Carlisle or the Galloway ports such as Kirkcudbright.

While the fortifications in the eastern part of Galloway may have been secured, the west had not been. Edward was unable to engage the Scots in any decisive action in the east, or to gain permanent control of any strong points in the region. This meant that the Scottish nobles with interests in the area, such as the Bruces, were able to retain control and continue drawing support from the region. Additionally, nobles such as John de St. John who were promised grants from the region had to be compensated elsewhere due to the English inability to draw resources from the region¹⁶⁶.

The inability to make gains in this region also spelled the end for the year of extending control either north into Ayrshire or in taking concrete steps to gain control in areas such as the Selkirk Forest. Rather than bringing the weight of the full campaigning army to bear in these areas, Edward had to depend on his local officers to attempt to carry through his policies and gain some successes in the region. With the reduction of the garrisons in order to strengthen the army, this became increasingly difficult to do. While expeditions were carried out under St. John and under William Latimer, little was achieved¹⁶⁷.

In essence, the final result of the campaign was the conclusion of the October 30th truce and the tacit acknowledgement that 1300, barring the taking of Caerlaverock, was a year without major gains. If nothing else, it convinced Edward

¹⁶⁵ *War, Politics and Finance*, p 175

¹⁶⁶ *CPR 1292-1301*, p 537-8

¹⁶⁷ *Under the Hammer*, p 109-10

of the necessity for repeated campaigning with the royal army in Scotland for any gains to be kept and consolidated.

There were also permanent changes in the way the army was recruited. The infantry, especially, received much more care in its selection. The number of commissioners of array was increased dramatically, as were the penalties involved for those who deserted after signing on for the king's wages. An understanding that quality was as necessary as quantity was reached, along with the cost reductions involved in selecting a smaller number of solid troops as opposed to large numbers of those prone to desert. This campaign saw the navy regularized as well, which dealt with the difficulties of years past with supply ships not appearing when needed.

The war certainly was not over. November 9th and 10th saw John de St. John, William Latimer, Robert and Richard Hasting, and Simon Lindsey all being confirmed in positions in the border regions, and May 12th of the next year saw the issue of writs for levying the troops for the next year¹⁶⁸. The importance of the Caerlaverock campaign is more in the fortuitous survival of primary source material, allowing a detailed picture of the English forces and expenditures over a year during the Scottish wars, than in what it actually achieved for Edward and the English in Scotland.

¹⁶⁸ *CDS*, ii, 1170-4, 1202

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